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INTRODUCTION
On December 18, 1997, Stuart A. Newman, a professor of cell
biology and anatomy at New York Medical College, and Jeremy
Rifkin,' long-time biotechnology critic and President of the
Washington, D.C.-based Foundation on Economic Trends, filed a
patent application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO"). The Newman-Rifkin patent application covered the first-
time ever production of an animal-human "chimera" that could
contain up to 50% human genetic material. Among those who heard
of the application, a storm of controversy followed. Many in the
media dismissed the application as yet another bizarre and irrelevant
ploy of Jeremy Rifkin, whom some have characterized as being
something of a gadfly.2 Seemingly lost in all the brouhaha over
Jeremy Rifkin being involved in the patent application was the
background of Mr. Rifkin's co-applicant, Stuart Newman, who was
on the Board of Directors of the Council for Responsible Genetics
("CRG")3, and did not share Rifkin's previous notoriety.
Just what is a chimera? According to ancient Greek mythology,4
a chimera was a fire-breathing female monster with a lion's head, a
goat's body, and a serpent's tail. In more modem times, the word is
most often used to refer to something that is illusory or does not exist.
However, with changes in technology, the term chimera has also
returned closer to its original mythological meaning, describing a
monster that may actually exist. In this context, a chimera has been
likened to a hybrid.
In a hybrid, the male of one species is genetically crossed with a
female of another species to produce the hybrid. A mule is an
example of an animal hybrid. Hybrid corn is an example of a hybrid
plant. It is produced by in-breeding corn, rather than using open
pollination.5 Hybrid mules are biologically sterile while hybrid corn
1. Author of The Biotech Century, The End Of Work, and numerous other books, Jeremy
Rifkin holds degrees in economics from the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the
University of Pennsylvania, and a degree in international affairs from the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
2. Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in
Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 469, 504 (2003).
3. Other CRG Board members are described in its website, at http://www.gene-
watch.org/org/directors.html, which includes a laundry list of reputable names from an
impressive variety of fields.
4. Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 433 (1999).
5. Open pollination is the term used to describe pollination that occurs as a result of
natural causes without any human intervention. Examples would include wind and insects.
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is "economically sterile." That is, the yield on hybrid corn
progressively deteriorates past the first generation such that farmers
must go back each year to the first generation of the hybrid,6 if they
decide to grow hybrid corn in the first place.
Because of its economic sterility, hybrid corn is valued for its
ability to be produced in the massive quantities that are prized in
industrialized agriculture. The very sterility of hybrid corn also
makes it valuable to agribusiness because farmers must return again
and again to buy seed to grow each crop. Significantly, hybrid corn
also requires massive inputs (such as synthetic fertilizers damaging to
the environment) to grow, further increasing the dependence of the
farmer on industrial agribusiness. Hybrid plants, like industrial
agribusiness, are relative newcomers to America, not becoming
popular in the U.S. until the 1930s. This trend represents a significant
change from the pre-1930s, when it was still common for American
farmers to save their seed and produce crops without having to
purchase many additional inputs such as chemical fertilizers and
pesticides not produced already on the farm itself. In other words,
most American farming used to be more self-sufficient than it is
today.
A mule is an example of an animal hybrid.7 Mules can only be
produced artificially, by breeding a naturally occurring donkey with a
naturally occurring horse. As a result of sexual breeding between
these two species, fertilization occurs and a mule embryo results
within the mother's womb. Every cell in the resulting hybrid mule
embryo contains one set of chromosomes from the donkey and one
set of chromosomes from the horse.8 However, if one mule mates
with another, a baby mule cannot result, making the mule a
biologically sterile animal. 9
Many animals and plants cannot be hybridized at all. However,
this is not the case with fish. Hybrid fish may occur naturally, as well
as artificially, and are raised in hatcheries. However, hybrid fish do
tend to have lower fertility than non-hybrid fish,1° yet similar to
plants, they exhibit better growth rates (hybrid vigor) than their
6. A hybrid is the offspring of two plants or animals of different species or varieties.
OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY & THESAURUS 1285 (1997).
7. Mule, at http://www.imh.org/imh/bw/mule.html#hist (last visisted Oct. 31, 2004).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission website, at
http://www.sites.state.pa.us/PAExec/FishBoat/images/pages/qa/fish/hybrid-breeding.htm
(last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
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parents. Hybrid fish are also easier to catch than their parent species,
making them appealing to the present-day commercial sector.11
Naturally-occurring hybrid fish share at least one fundamental
characteristic with the mule, and even inbred plants. The laws of
Nature essentially slow down or even eliminate altogether the
introduction of each hybrid into existing ecosystems. For example,
hybrid fish have a propensity for being caught.1 2 This limits their life-
span as well as their ability to reproduce themselves. Similarly, the
inbred plant's progeny diminishes from one generation to the next, if
left to its own devices. The mule has not been able to reproduce itself
even after hundreds of years of existence due to continued human
intervention.
In contrast to hybrids, a modem chimera, such as the one
proposed in the Newman-Rifkin patent application, is an organism
whose component cells do not originate from both originating species
in the way that a mule's or hybrid plant or fish do. Scientists may
produce a modem-day chimera by manipulating two different species
of the same or even different genera at the cellular level. 13  For
example, a human-chimpanzee chimera would have some human
brain cells and some chimpanzee brain cells.
14
The actual physical appearance of such a chimera is currently not
known. For all we know, half-human chimeras may at times be
almost impossible to distinguish by appearance, just as some hybrid
fish are.15  On the other hand, their origins might be physically
obvious. We do know that, at the cellular level, none of the chimera
brain cells would contain both human and chimp brain cells.
16
Unlike naturally occurring hybrid fish, inbred plants, and mules,
the forms of artificially produced hybrid plants favored in industrial
agribusiness have put an unprecedented amount of pressure on the
global ecosystem, effectively "upping the ante" for environmental
devastation on regional and global levels; they have been introduced
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. A genus is a biological grouping of several species that share common structural
characteristics. For example, the parent species of hybrid corn are different species of corn, but
the same genus. The parent species of hybrid fish are all fish. Donkeys, zebras, and horses are
both members of the same genus, the horse, but different species. Chimeras, in contrast, may
cross genera, such that a cross between a fish and corn may result in two different species as
well as genera.
14. Magnani, supra note 4, at 446.
15. Dr. Ronald M. Coleman et al., Who Needs Another Hybrid Fish?, available at
http://www.malawicichlids.com/mwOl013.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
16. Magnani, supra note 4, at 445.
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into ecosystems without being constrained by the pre-existing
limitations that Nature has in place for every other living thing on this
planet. Similarly, a human-nonhuman chimera raises the genetic and
moral stakes exponentially. For example, it is not even known
whether a modem chimera could reproduce independently, or whether
reproduction would require scientific intervention. Either possibility
raises deeply troubling questions.
Human-nonhuman chimeras are still theoretical at this point. So
why did Newman and Rifkin attempt to patent something that is still
only theoretical? Patents applications are usually submitted for
existing things. Newman and Rifkin made public statements about
their reasons for applying for a patent on a human-nonhuman
chimera. Among the reasons given: (1) mammal-mammal chimeras
with no human components have already been produced, and (2)
patents already exist on animals into which some human genes have
been inserted, such as the Harvard Onco-mouse. Both of these have
put half-human chimeras dangerously close at hand. 
17
But the rationale given by Newman and Rifkin that is most
striking is that the purpose of their patent application was to force
public debate on the directions in which genetic engineering and
patenting have been going. Their theory was that the patent
application would obstruct the future production of human-animal
chimeras in either of two ways. 18 First, if the PTO actually granted
their patent, they could then prevent others from receiving one and
using it while the public takes a more active role in monitoring
genetic engineering and patenting. 19 Or, second, the controversy
surrounding the patent application itself would generate enough
public debate with the same results.2 °
Indeed, much thought was put into the application.2 1 It was
carefully crafted to avoid being summarily rejected on the grounds
that it was outside the novelty and non-obviousness requirements that
17. Bagley, supra note 2, at 505.
18. Cynthia Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and
Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 247, 248 (2000).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The application is itself confidential in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994). This
provision has been amended since the Newman-Rifkin patent application, but is not retroactive.
However, Rifkin has made several statements to the media concerning the contents of the
application.
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all patents are supposed to meet. They described different
techniques than those used to produce previous nonhuman mammal-
mammal chimeras, which were already patented 3 Furthermore, they
drafted their patent application to cover only those chimeras with less
than 50% genetic material from humans in an attempt to force the
PTO to consider the question of how much human genetic material it
takes to make a living thing human.24 For example, would a chimera
with 49% human material and 51% chimpanzee material still be
considered a human? Finally, the co-applicants identified several
arguably non-immoral uses for the chimeras. This too would force a
deeper debate on the moral utility requirement in patent law.
At first glance, the Newman-Rifkin patent application may seem
to have little to do with indigenous law or indigenous peoples. As
this article will demonstrate however, the Newman-Rifkin patent
application is actually part of a broader debate on the direction in
which this country's socioeconomic and technological development is
going and the proper role of patent law in driving that development in
certain directions. Simultaneously, debate has grown over indigenous
claims that their cultural property and traditional knowledge have
been misused and misappropriated through the use of the same
Western intellectual property laws that were the subject of the
Newman-Rifkin patent application and its predecessors.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that important issues
and legal developments leading up to and surrounding the Newman-
Rifkin patent application parallel those within the present debate
surrounding misuse and misappropriation of indigenous cultural
property and traditional knowledge.25 It raises the question of whether
these two parallel tracks in patent law are converging in any useful
way and what effect such convergence, or lack thereof, might have on
the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples.
Part I surveys some of the arguments, including those emanating
from indigenous peoples, advanced in the debate over animal, plant,
22. Magnani, supra note 4; see also Margaret Graham Tebo, The Big Gene Profit
Machine, 87 A.B.A. J. 46, 52 (Apr. 2001).
23. Magnani, supra note 4.
24. Id.; see also Rick Weiss, Patent Sought on Making of Part-Human Creatures:
Scientist Seeks to Touch Off Ethics Debate, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1998, at A12.
25. There has been some debate surrounding which is the correct terminology to use
when referring to such knowledge. Other terms have been indigenous intellectual property
rights and traditional resource rights. The terms cultural property and traditional knowledge are
used within this paper without debating the relative merits of the terms for the sake of
convenience.
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micro-organism, and human genetic material patenting. Because the
Newman-Rifkin chimera was preceded by pertinent changes in the
patenting of plants, it begins with an analysis of the origins of the
Plant Patent Act of 193026 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of
1970,27 particularly in relation to the later developments in an
intimately related case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty.28 The analysis
highlights the pivotal role played by the growth of industrialized
agriculture, and the response of the courts to that growth, in the
gradual evisceration of the "product of nature" doctrine. As will be
demonstrated, this evisceration was a necessary intellectual and moral
prerequisite for the decision in Chakrabarty and its aftermath. It also
resulted in legally unfettered opportunities for biopiracy controversies
to arise internationally, such as that surrounding the patents within the
U.S. on the ayahuasca plant and on naturally colored cotton, both of
which originated among the indigenous peoples of Latin America.
Part II analyzes how a specific area of patent law, "the moral
utility requirement," connects the Newman-Rifkin patent application,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and the latter's legal progeny to indigenous
concerns. It begins by analyzing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the
Supreme Court decision most frequently hailed as that Court's first
judicial stamp of approval on genetically modified organisms. It
questions that conclusion, asserting instead that Diamond v.
Chakrabarty is really the Court's first ambivalent "punt" of the issue
back to a society that has left the burgeoning biotechnology industry
largely unregulated. Part II then traces the origin, development, and
decline of the moral utility requirement, which, together with the
evisceration of the product of nature doctrine, have taken the heart,
mind, and integrity out of patent law.
Part III discusses Western views of the socioeconomic, safety,
and ethical concerns implicated during the development of patent law.
It also examines some recent potential legal solutions to indigenous
concerns over misuse and misappropriation, which range from
proposed changes to recognized prior art within U.S. patent law to the
development of a sui generis system recognizing indigenous laws.
These proposals suffer from a failure to analyze the problem in light
of the pivotal Marshall Trilogy, a series of federal Indian law cases
that came out of the same era as the geographical limitation on prior
art. I will analyze these proposals as well as speculate on whether
26. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164.
27. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583.
28. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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they could, in turn, address some of the unanswered questions raised
by the Newman-Rifkin patent application.
Part IV then looks at the critical institutional and attitudinal
obstacles to reforming patent law, including my proposed solutions to
indigenous concerns over misappropriation of their cultural property
and traditional knowledge. Specifically, this article argues that
Western socioeconomic and technological development should
parallel and complement, rather than exploit and suppress, indigenous
socioeconomic and technological development. This would be for the
good of the West as well as indigenous peoples and requires a
congressional ban, or at least a moratorium, on patenting of life
forms. Discussion on the advisability of such patents should include,
in a meaningful way, both indigenous peoples and the general public.
Congress should pass legislation that gives the Patent and
Trademark Office clear direction on the legality of patents on life
forms, as well as legislatively discourage the commercial use of this
technology. Congress should also pass legislation rescinding Title 25
U.S.C. § 17, which declared in 1871 that Indian tribes were not
sovereign nations with whom the U.S. could make any additional
treaties. While this may seem radical to some due to its far-reaching
implications, this article will demonstrate why its adoption is long
overdue within the U.S. Rescinding § 17 could be an important
symbol, as well as a practical tool, in a badly needed and
fundamentally revamped U.S. policy towards Indian tribes within, as
well as outside the U.S.
I. ORIGINS OF HALF-HUMAN CREATURES IN THE PLANT PATENT AND
PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACTS AND IN THE CORRESPONDING
EVISCERATION OF THE "PRODUCT OF NATURE" DOCTRINE
Patents have long been a part of the legal system in the U.S.
Indeed, the United States Constitution reserves to the federal
government the power to grant exclusive patents. Specifically, "the
Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries. ' '29 A patent is essentially a monopoly since it gives the
patent-owner the legal right to exclude others from making, using or
selling whatever invention is patented, unless the owner chooses to
accept payment in the form of royalties. In recognition of the
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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inherent danger of a government-sanctioned monopoly, the
Constitution, and codifications of patent law, limit the duration of the
legal monopoly granted through patents.
Congress passed the original Patent Act 30 in 1793 with
subsequent modifications over the years. The Patent Act has long
identified three basic elements necessary to obtain a patent on an
invention. The invention must be "useful" or have utility,3' it must
have "novelty,"32 and it must consist of non-obvious subject matter.33
Prior to the early 20th century, patents were largely confined to
mechanical innovations.34 Many contend that it was not until the
1980 Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty that patent law
experienced a fundamental shift. Chakrabarty purportedly paved the
legal way for the advent of patenting of genetically modified
organisms, the rise of the biotechnology industry, and eventually the
theoretical half-human creatures such as those described in the
Newman-Rifkin patent application.
A. The Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety
Protection Act of 1970
Diamond v. Chakrabarty is not where the fundamental shift in
patent law has its roots. Rather, Chakrabarty was the culmination of
a fundamental shift in patent law that actually occurred back in the
1930s with the passage of the Plant Patent Act35 ("PPA"). The
passage of the PPA allowed for patents on newly discovered or
invented, distinct, asexually-reproduced plants.
As a practical matter, this meant patents were allowed for fruits
and some flowers. 36 However, sexually-reproducing plants, such as
grains and vegetables, were omitted, as were two asexually-
reproducing plants, potatoes, and Jerusalem artichokes. 37  The
deliberate omission of these plants was apparently the result of a
Congressional concern at the time that "food," or staple food plants,
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
31. Id. §101.
32. Id. §102.
33. Id. §103 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
34. Patents on chemical innovations comprised the bulk of the rest of patent law during
earlier centuries. Chemical innovations, however, did not require any major shift in existing
patent laws.
35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1994).
36. Cary Fowler, The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of Its Creation, 82
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 621, 636 (2000).
37. Id.
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should not be patented. It was also a reflection of the fact that
commercial agribusiness was still in the beginning stages of
commodifying the omitted plants through an increasing, but far from
required, dependence on hybridization.
Cary Fowler, an Associate Professor at the Norwegian Center for
International Environment and Development Studies at the
Agricultural University of Norway and Senior Advisor to the Director
General of the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute in
Rome, has written a pivotal piece that appeared in the Journal of the
Patent and Trademark Office Society. In his article, Fowler asserts
that the 1930 Plant Patent Act did not result from the expressed needs
of then-existing plant breeders. 39 Small farmers, "leftovers" from a
largely agrarian society that was experiencing rapid industrialization,
were almost invariably the actual plant breeders, innovating without
the impetus of patent law. 40 For example, Fowler describes an Iowa
farmer who discovered the Delicious apple purely by chance.41 Most
"breeding" that was being done at this time was actually the result of
an alert farmer "discovering" some desirable seedling purely by
chance (a "chance seedling"), simple mass selection, and/or farmer
experimentation. Mendel's rediscovered theory of genetics, the basis
of today's formal or "scientific" plant breeding, was not popularly
accepted and applied until many years after passage of the PPA.42 It
was the seed companies and nurserymen of the day, i.e., the sellers
not the "breeders, ' ' 3 to whom Congressional members gave credit for
development of the Delicious apple during debate on the PPA.44
Indeed, Stark Brothers Nurseries was the main proponent for
passage of the bill. While Stark Brothers was the country's leading
nursery at that time, it was not significantly involved in actual plant
breeding.45 In fact, in 1992, Clay Stark Logan, President of Stark
38. Id.
39. Fowler, supra note 36, at 643-44 ("Nursery companies are not breeding new
varieties. They are taking newly discovered varieties and commercializing them .... These
groups and individuals, in other words, are not constructing laws to facilitate their use of the
technology or help make its use more profitable.").
40. Id. at 625-26.
41. Id. at629.
42. Id. at 624-25.
43. The Delicious apple breeder would more properly be called a "discoverer" since he
happened upon the chance seedling on his Iowa farm. In other words, this alert farmer
discovered that this particular apple, already produced by Nature completely on its own, tasted
better than some of the other apples on his farm.
44. Fowler, supra note 36 at 630, 639-40.
45. Id. at 630.
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Brothers, stated that the company had "never" done any breeding
work. 6 The company's main concern in getting the PPA passed was
to place a legal fence around uncooperative fruit trees 47 that, in total
disregard of legal constraints, freely grow in whatever soil is most
hospitable.
Unfortunately for those interested in being a dominant actor in
the business of selling fruit trees, the trees can be easily reproduced
by grafting. Prior to passage of the PPA, Stark Brothers had
purchased another Delicious apple tree growing in New Jersey for
$6,000 and erected a tall fence around it to try to prevent others from
grafting wood from it. Stark Brothers (along with other fruit
merchants) was particularly vulnerable to competitors who could
"steal" a variety from a customer to whom Stark had sold a fruit tree
by grafting from the original fruit tree.48 Prior to passage of the PPA,
Stark had no legal remedy against that competition. Stark could,
however, greatly increase his sales if he could wield the kind of legal
control over and protection of varieties that the PPA afforded.49
Jack R. Kloppenburg, a Professor in the Department of Rural
Sociology as well as the Gaylord Nelson Institute of Environmental
Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, has written a
comprehensive book on the development of plant biotechnology and
its socioeconomic significance called First the Seed The Political
Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000. Kloppenburg, as well
as Fowler, describe major shifts in the definition of what constituted
an invention as well as the law to accommodate certain interests that
became entrenched in the American economy. The sellers of fruits
and flowers were referred to as "plant breeders," a major conceptual
shift since it was contrary to reality. The plant breeders in turn were
referred to as "inventors," although genuine breeders of that time
were seldom even deliberately engaged in breeding work; their
subject matter's "inventiveness" was therefore very questionable.
Stark Brothers simply wanted to obtain better control over the profits
to be had from the varieties it was selling and was not actually in the
business of plant breeding.5
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 631.
49. Id. at 630-31.
50. Fowler, supra note 36, at 642.
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To accommodate this fact, the core requirements of the Patent
Act had to be watered down significantly for plant patents. The PPA
therefore allowed a patent to anyone who "has invented or discovered
and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant, other
than a tuber-propagated plant. . . . 51 It was here that discovery
became equated with invention, although the two words are hardly
synonymous, and mere varieties first became treated in law as though
they were as significant as a new breed of plant.
The PPA further weakened the Patent Act by eliminating the
requirement that an invention be useful, and instead requiring only
that a new plant variety be new and distinct. Additionally, a new
plant variety no longer had to be superior in quality to existing
varieties to be patentable under the PPA.52 Distinctiveness was left
undefined, another key feature of the PPA that weakened the thrust of
the Patent Act. Nature itself is notorious for exhibiting big as well as
small differences between every living thing on this planet. Identical
twins are not really identical. And how many of us remember the
phrase, "no two snowflakes are alike"? Furthermore, although the
Patent Act requires that a putative invention be described sufficiently
well to enable another to reproduce it, this requirement was
eliminated in the case of plant patents, revealing again the primary
motive behind passage of the PPA-to protect sellers of asexually-
reproduced plants from too much competition.
The PPA not only handed patentability over plants to seed
companies and nurseries, while leaving out the farmer, its watering
down of core patent law requirements virtually guaranteed increasing
economic profits, and therefore power, for the former. Paul C. Stark
of Stark Brothers Nurseries was one highly influential actor in this
change in the law. According to Fowler, the Stark family had large
landholdings, was politically very powerful, and had business
relationships with the growing railroad industry at a critical juncture
in the development of the PPA 3 It was Paul C. Stark who, in 1930,
urged the American Seed Trade Association ("ASTA") that
[i]t seemed to be the wise thing to get established the principle that
Congress recognized the rights of the plant breeder and originator.
51. Id. at 641 (second emphasis added); see also JACK R. KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE
SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000 (Cambridge
University Press 1988). Fowler and Kloppenburg also point out that the protection and
promotion of research was not one of the goals in passing the PPA.
52. Fowler, supra note 36, at 64 1; KLOPPENBURG, supra note 5 1, at 133.
53. Fowler, supra note 36, at 629 (describing additional details on the political influence
of the Stark family at the state and national level).
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Then, in the light of experience, effort could be made to get
protection also for seed propagated plants, which would be much
easier after this fundamental principle was established.
54
By 1970, the seed industry was well-entrenched in the research
and development of private plant varieties as a direct result of a
systematic effort in the 1950s to displace agricultural science that had
historically been in the public sector. Hybrid plants, which required
the farmer to return again and again to the seed company to plant a
new crop, were by then "king" of the U.S. agricultural sector. Also
during the 1950s, the seed industry successfully made the argument
that certification of seed should be based solely on varietal purity and
that the consumer should be left to determine quality, unaided by the
historical association of government certification with quality seed.55
The seed industry thus continued its efforts, enunciated back in the
1930s by the ASTA, to expand the fundamental shifts in patent law
that the PPA represented to sexually-reproduced plants. In 1969, the
ASTA drafted the bill that would, in the following year, become
known as the Plant Variety Protection Act.56
The seedsmen of today are the Monsantos, Pfizers, Upjohns, Ciba-
Geigys, Shells, and ARCOs of the world. In addition, the last
decade has seen the founding of over one hundred genetic
engineering firms sporting such evocative names as Agrigenetics,
Advanced Genetic Sciences, DNA Plant Technology Corp.,
Hybritech, Molecular Genetics, and Repligen.... Both
transnationals and the "genetic research boutiques" are gearing up
to enter a market for seed that is projected to be worth some $7
billion in the United States alone by the year 2000.
57
It was within this already-existing business environment then,
with patent law already fundamentally weakened through the PPA of
54. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 51, at 133. Stark made this prescient statement to the
American Seed Trade Association, which was lobbying to have sexually reproduced plants
included in the PPA, to discourage them from pressing Congress too hard. Even in 1930, the
seed and nursery industries had their eyes on further jettisoning core patent law requirements, by
including sexually-reproduced plants under the same kind of watered-down patent requirements
as the asexually-reproduced plants covered under the PPA. Stark's prediction came true in
1970, when Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection Act ("PVPA"). The PVPA extends
patent protection to those who develop new varieties of sexually-reproduced plants.
55. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 51, at 135.
56. Id. at 139. It is worth noting here that Kloppenburg also demonstrates that the
proponents of the bill explicitly recognized that the approach taken in the PVPA to varietals
protection would reduce the free exchange of germplasm.
57. Id. at 16 (citations omitted). Since 1970, virtually every American seed company of
any importance has merged in one way or another with multinational corporations with strong
ties to the biotechnology industry and pharmaceuticals.
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1930 and expanded to sexually-reproducing plants in the PVPA of
1970, that the Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision was made.
B. The "Product of Nature" Doctrine
The 1980 Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty is
widely considered to be the first "living patent" case that ushered in
the subsequent flood of patents on genetically engineered organisms.
Any discussion of the Newman-Rifkin patent application usually
refers to Chakrabarty in one way or another. .However, as already
discussed, it is more instructive to look back to the statutory
precedents set in the PPA of 1930, the PVPA of 1970, and the
socioeconomic forces driving both. It is there that one finds strong
ties between seed companies and biotechnology, plants, and micro-
organisms.
When one starts to look at case law developments involving
micro-organisms (which exist somewhere in between the plant and
animal kingdoms and are visible to the naked eye), pressures similar
to those brought to bear in the passage of the PPA and the PVPA,
emerge within the rest of the Patent Act. However, the pressures are
brought to bear against the PTO5 8 and in the case law, rather than in
fundamental changes in the statutory language of the Patent Act itself.
The subject of dispute for the case law was the "product of nature"
doctrine, which essentially states that "products of nature," or things
that are the work of Nature rather than of humans, are not patentable
since they do not meet the novelty requirement of the Patent Act.
Under this doctrine, putative inventors were not rewarded with a
patent for discovering a living organism, even if it was previously
unknown, because it already existed in nature.
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,59 a 1948 Supreme
Court decision, is often cited as being representative of the "product
of nature" doctrine.6° In Funk Bros., Kalo Inoculant Company filed a
58. Aspiring patent-owners initially file their applications with the PTO, an
administrative agency, whereupon a patent examiner determines whether the PTO should grant
the patent or not. If the patent application is denied, the applicant may appeal the decision to an
administrative review board and the Board of Patent Appeals or "Board." If the application is
denied at the Board level, a federal district court may then review it. Historically, the PTO has
seen its decisions disallowing patents on microorganisms reversed either by the Board or a
federal court. Prior to the organization of the Federal Circuit, unfavorable patent decisions were
appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A.").
59. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
60. James P. Daniel, Of Mice and 'Manimal': The Patent & Trademark Office's Latest
Stance Against Patent Protection for Human-Based Inventions, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 106
(1999).
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patent infringement suit against Funk Brothers Seed, claiming that it
had a valid patent for a mixture of bacterial strains used to infect plant
61
roots, an inoculant, which thereby aided the plant in fixing nitrogen.
In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated Kalo Inoculant's patent,
citing that the mixture was merely the combined effect that the
individual strains of bacteria already had on their own 62; the patent-
owner had only used a property that bacteria themselves naturally
possessed.
Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the
package infects the same group of leguminous plants which it always
infected. No species acquires a different use. The combination of
species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of
bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each
species has the same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in
their natural way. Their use in combination does not improve in any
way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally
provided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.63
In other words, the mere combination of individual bacteria
already possessing these properties, while convenient for the
purchaser and an important commercial advance, was insufficient to
meet the requirements for patentability.
However, as early as 1873, a patent was issued to Louis Pasteur.
Pasteur's patent was on a purified yeast that was free from organic
germs of diseases. 64 He successfully claimed that the purified yeast
was an article of manufacture under the Patent Act.65 However, this
seemed to be a fluke, since the PTO consistently denied patents on
living organisms themselves from 1873 to the time of Chakrabarty's
patent application.66 Patents for compositions that contained living
organisms, such as waste-disposal systems containing bacteria,67 were
routinely granted. 68 The holding in Funk Brothers Seed Company
61. Id.
62. Id. at 106-07.
63. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 133.
64. Daniel, supra note 60, at 104.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 105.
67. Id. (citing City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934)
(recognizing patent for septic tank utilizing bacteria); Union Solvents Corp. v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 61 F.2d 1041 (3rd Cir. 1932) (recognizing infringement of patent for a bacterial process
utilized in the synthesis of alcohol); Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs,
159 F.453 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding valid a patent for a septic tank utilizing bacteria)).
68. See Fowler, supra note 36.
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was in line with this longstanding trend since it involved a patent on
the living organism itself, albeit several strains of bacteria.
Ironically, Kalo Inoculant Company was a precursor to today's
biotechnology company and the by-then more developed seed
industry, represented by Funk Brothers Seed, was the patent infringer.
Funk Brothers Seed Company eventually won the case at the Supreme
Court level. 69  Pre-biotech companies were thus facing the same
conundrum that seed companies had faced back in the 1930s.
Namely, how were they going to capture more profit on something
that already existed in nature (this time micro-organisms instead of
asexually-reproduced plants) and over which they had less control
they than would like?
By 1948, the seed companies had solved their problem by
fundamentally weakening patent law in the form of the PPA. These
businesses were then able to expand much more than they normally
would have had they been left alone. Seed companies had
accomplished the passage of the PPA at a time when they had the
luxury of relative obscurity and therefore little opposition. Seed
companies were also well on their way to adding sexually-reproduced
plants to their arsenal as a direct result of their coup back in 1930.
They could afford to infringe a patent on bacteria, knowing full well
that their own industry was fully protected since they essentially had a
statutory exemption in the form of the PPA that allowed them to get
the same kind of patent Kalo Inoculant had claimed, but on asexually-
reproduced plants. It was only a matter of time before they would be
strong enough to take on any opposition70 to patenting sexually-
reproduced plants as well.
Upon close examination, like the seed companies of the 1930s,
biotechnicians such as Kalo Inoculant were not really inventors
because "[b]iotechnicians alter, modify, assist, or manipulate nature.
Biotechnicians are not inventors of organisms or genes ... ,,7 1 This
was true when use patents were granted on waste septic systems that
contained micro-organisms performing functions that came naturally
and often proved useful to humans as well. This is true even today
when one closely examines all of the so-called advances being made
in cloning, gene sequencing, and the like; these are simply the actions
of biotechnicians altering, modifying, assisting, or manipulating what
69. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
70. Opposition from smaller farmers, publicly-funded researchers, and environmentalists.
71. Daniel, supra note 60, at 106 (quoting Ned Hettinger, Patenting Life: Biotechnology,
Intellectual Property, and Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 267, 289 (1995)).
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already exists in Nature. Therefore, in the absence of their own
personalized PPA-like statutory exemption to the Patent Act,
biotechnicians could not patent micro-organisms in 1948.
This remained true until 1979 and 1980, when In re Bergy 72 and
Diamond v. Chakrabarty were decided. In Bergy, three
microbiologists developed a new method for cultivating an old
antibiotic lincomycin B. 73 During this new process, they noticed a
previously-unknown micro-organism, Streptomyces vellosus, that
proved to be useful in producing a purified form of lincomycin. The
purer form was advantageous because using this "new" form of
Streptomyces vellosus in the production process resulted in increased
efficiency in the recovery of lincomycin.74 The three successfully
applied for patents on the process used in producing the antibiotic.
However, the PTO patent examiner initially rejected their application
to also patent the micro-organism Streptomyces vellosus itself 75 as a
product of nature, relying on Funk Brothers Seed Company.7 6 The
Board agreed.77  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("C.C.P.A.") initially reversed the decision of the Board.78 However,
the Supreme Court vacated the C.C.P.A.'s initial ruling and ordered
reconsideration in light of its ruling in Parker v. Flook,79 a case in
which the Court decided that a computerized method of updating
alarm limits by application of a mathematical formula was not
patentable, essentially on the "product of nature" grounds, i.e.,
mathematical formulae are generally laws of nature or abstract ideas.
However, the Court did not elaborate on how Flook was
applicable in Bergy and in the meantime, its decision in Chakrabarty,
came down. Upon reconsideration, then, the C.C.P.A. combined its
reconsideration of Bergy with a reconsideration of Chakrabarty and
reaffirmed its previous decision that Streptomyces vellosus itself was
patentable, emphasizing that the purified form of the organism-
organism took it out of the "product of nature" doctrine. The
C.C.P.A. took additional pains to underscore that it would not have
72. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
73. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 51, at 108.
74. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 967.
75. ld.
76. Exparte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78, 82 (Bd. of Appeals 1976).
77. id.
78. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 956.
79. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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upheld and reaffirmed the patent on the organism-organism itself if it
had remained in its impure form.8 °
It seems illogical to us to insist that the existence of life in a
manufacture or composition of matter in the form of a biologically
pure culture of a microorganism removes it from the category of
subject matter which can be patented while the functioning of a
living organism and the utilization of its life functions in processes
does not affect their status under § 101 81
The C.C.P.A. seemed to view the entire question of patenting
living organisms rather frivolously. In effect, it decided that because
use patents are allowed on processes involving living organisms (e.g.,
a patent on a septic tank), then a patent on the living organism itself
ought to be allowed as well.
Why did the C.C.P.A. blithely blur the distinctions between what
is and is not patentable subject matter in an area that they themselves
described as having a "difficult path to patentability? 8 2 The C.C.P.A.
took additional pains to point out that "being an inventor and having
made an invention is not changed by the fact that one or more or all of
the conditions for patentability cannot be met," 83 which meant that the
C.C.P.A. certainly understood that being a patent-holder and being an
inventor are not necessarily synonymous. Yet, the C.C.P.A. allowed
the patent in spite of this fact.
Part of the answer to the C.C.P.A.'s findings, and the
significance of Bergy, lies in a closer examination of the parties
involved in the case. The real party in interest in Bergy was the
assignee of the patent application, the Upjohn Company, not the three
microbiologists. Genentech, Inc. (then a "tiny San Francisco
company, just two years old"84), the American Patent Law
Association, the Regents of the University of California, and a patent
attorney filed amicus curiae briefs. This array of advocates in favor
of the patenting of the microorganism itself serves as a concrete
example of the frequent collaboration between business and academia
to privatize and commodify research. The similarities of the
protagonists in Bergy to those responsible for the passage of the PPA
in 1930 are startling. Some of the basic similarities found in the
80. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 976-77.
81. Id. at 977.
82. Id. at 960.
83. Id. at 962 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 974 (quoting A Commercial Debut For DNA Technology, BUSINESS WEEK,
Dec. 12, 1977, at 128).
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protagonists in Bergy would continue in Chakrabarty with some
significant, but generally ignored, differences.
C. The Ayahuasca Patent Case
In March of 1999, a coalition of Amazonian indigenous peoples
and The Center for International Environmental Law ("CIEL") came
before the PTO to request the cancellation of the ayahuasca patent.
85
Ayahuasca is a woody vine native to the Amazon, which has been
ingested in a medicinal drink sometimes called yag, 86 used as a
religious symbol, and to contact spirits, treat sickness, and foresee the
future by indigenous peoples of that region for hundreds of years.87
This case is illuminating for several reasons.
First, the patent was originally granted based on the watered-
down patentability requirements of the PVPA. Second, Loren Miller
of the U.S., the putative "inventor" of the ayahuasca plant, was issued
the patent back in 198688 for a plant that he admitted, within the
patent application itself, that he had found in someone else's garden
in the Amazon.89 Third, in his patent, Miller claimed protection based
on the plant's medicinal properties,9" although those same properties
were already well known to indigenous peoples of the Amazon.91
This fact alone should have made Miller's patent fail, even under the
PVPA,92 because it fails the novelty and non-obviousness tests.
However, the PTO ultimately avoided deciding whether indigenous
85. The Ayahuasca Patent Case, Center for International Environmental Law, at
http://www.ciel.org/Biodiversity/ayahuascapatentcase.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2004).
86. Ayahuasca, Yagg, Caapi, Natema, at http://www.biopark.org/ayahuasca.htm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2004).
87. Glenn M. Wiser, PTO Rejection of the "Ayahyasca" Patent Claim: Background and
Analysis, Center for International Environmental Law, Nov. 1999, available at
http://www.ciel.orgBiodiversity/ptorejection.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
88. Id.; U.S. Plant Patent No. 5,751 (issued June 17, 1986). Application No. 669,745
filed on November 7, 1984 was a continuation application of No. 266,114, which was filed on
May 21, 1981 and later abandoned.
89. The Ayahuasca Patent Case, Center for International Environmental Law, at
http://www.ciel.org/Biodiversity/ayahuascapatentcase.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2004).
90. U.S. Plant Patent No. 5,751 (issued June 17, 1986), at 7-9, 15 (describing a Detailed
Statement in support of request for reexamination), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ReexaminationofUSPlantPatent5751 .pdf (last visited Nov. 26,
2004).
91. Id. at 15-16.
92. Id.
2005] WESTERN NOTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 403
traditional knowledge per se should be recognized as "prior art
93
under patent law. 94  The PTO thus implicitly rejected CIEL's
argument that indigenous study and consequent use of this knowledge
should have been sufficient to revoke the patent because it failed the
novelty prong, as such use had been well documented in Western
scientific literature.
95
Fortunately, in its argument before the PTO, CIEL also pointed
out that the species was by then widely known in the Western
scientific literature, as well as having been studied and used by
Western scientists. 96  The PTO ultimately accepted this argument
when it decided to revoke the patent on the basis of evidence of
"scientific" prior art in the form of mounted herbarium specimen
sheets.9 7 The ayahuasca patent case was apparently the first one in
which mounted herbarium specimen sheets were themselves accepted
as prior art in the form of a "printed publication," although there was
precedent for this interpretation.9 8
Fourth, Amazonian indigenous peoples did not find out about the
patent until years after it had been granted, 99 just as indigenous
93. Prior art is any relevant knowledge, acts, descriptions and patents which pertain to
and predate the invention in question, upon which a court may rely to hold a patent claim
invalid. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1193 (7th ed. 1999).
94. Press Release, Center for International Environmental Law, U.S. Patent Office
Admits Error, Rejects Patent Claim on Sacred "Ayahuasca" Plant (Nov. 4, 1999), at
http://www.ciel.org/Biodiversity/AyahuascaRejectionPR.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2004).
95. Id. The PTO deliberately rejected the validity of indigenous methodology, research
and development, a position that is symptomatic of what is fundamentally wrong with the
Western approach to indigenous intellectual property issues.
96. Id.
97. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. §102 (b), which prohibits the patenting of an invention that
was described or patented in a printed publication more than one year prior to the date of the
patent application.
98. Press Release, Center for International Environmental Law, U.S. Patent Office
Admits Error, Rejects Patent Claim on Sacred "Ayahuasca" Plant (Nov. 4, 1999), at
http://www.ciel.org/Biodiversity/AyahuascaRejectionPR.html (last visited on Nov. 26, 2004).
One wonders if the PTO would have been willing to extend its ruling to the acceptance of
indigenous "printed publications," such as if a wampum belt existed as tangible evidence of
indigenous use of ayahuasca. Logic dictates that it should, but it is possible that the PTO would
work very hard to find an exception that would justify not recognizing an indigenous form of
printed publication.
99. Wiser, supra note 87 (explaining in the background paper analyzing CIEL's work on
the ayahuasca patent reexamination that one of its co-filers, the Coordinating Body of
Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basic ("COICA") (which represented over 400
indigenous Amazonian tribes) did not find out about Miller's patent until 1994. They were
incredulous that Miller was able to obtain a patent on a plant so well-known and used "since
time immemorial" by them. Miller also apparently had plans to install a pharmaceutical
laboratory in Ecuador at a time when the U.S. and Ecuador were on the verge of approving a
bilateral intellectual property reciprocity agreement. The lab was supposed to process
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peoples around the globe did not find out that their genes had been
patented by various Western interests until after those patents had
already been granted.' 00 In the case of ayahuasca, the plant had been
sacred for centuries to many indigenous Amazonian cultures and,
from their viewpoint, should not have been patented at all'0° because
plants, like people, are life forms in their value system, therefore
sacred, and not to be owned by human beings. One can use such a
plant, in a respectful manner, but claiming that one "invented" uses
that indigenous peoples have been employing for hundreds of years
made no sense to them. Nor can a human being claim to have
invented something that already existed prior to the advent of patent
law itself. Essentially, the same argument-against the ownership of
life-has been advanced by indigenous peoples in several position
statements, declarations and resolutions that have been made in the
international arena over the past several years.' 0 2 As these documents
make abundantly clear, the patenting of life forms is contrary to the
ayahuasca and other plants. If Miller's plans came to fruition, then they could be forced to
recognize Miller's proprietary rights over ayahuasca within the Amazon region itself).
100. Illustrative is the patent obtained by a federal agency of the U.S. government in 1994
on cells in the DNA of the Hagahai of Papua New Guinea. After an international outcry, the
patent was withdrawn. Oren Lyons, and other indigenous activists, point out that the focus of
Western science continues to be preserving rather than changing conditions under which
indigenous peoples are forced to live.
101. U.S. Plant Patent No. 5,751 (issued June 17, 1986), at 24-27, available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ReexaminationofJSPlantPatent5751.pdf (last visited Nov. 26,
2004).
102. See, e.g., The 1993 Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, available at http://aotearora.wellington.net.nez/imp/mata.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2004); The 1994 COICA Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations
of the Amazon Basin Statement, available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/-wgtrr/coica.htm (last visited
Nov. 26, 2004); The February 1995 Sabah Statement from the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) Consultation on the Protection and Conservation of Indigenous
Knowledge, available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/-wgtrr/sabah.htm; The April 1995 Suva Final
Statement from the UNDP Consultation on Indigenous Peoples' Knowledge and Intellectual
Property Rights, available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/-wgtrr/suva.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2004);
The 1995 Declaration of Indigenous Peoples of the Western Hemisphere Regarding the Human
Genome Diversity Project, available at http://www.ankn.uaf.edu/declaration.html (last visited
Nov. 26, 2004); The 1997 Resolution on Patenting of Life adopted by the Third International
conference of the International Alliance of Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests,
available at http://iaip.gn.apc.org/third/png-eng.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2004); The July 1999
Indigenous Peoples' Statement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) of the WTO Agreement, available at http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/jpc/no-
patent.htmi (last visited Nov. 26, 2004); The December 1999 Indigenous Peoples' Seattle
Declaration, available at http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba-files/finance/seattle.htm (last visited
Nov. 26, 2004).
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laws of indigenous peoples from every continent on this planet.
10 3
Therefore, one could not patent a half-human creature either,
regardless of the percentage of human genes in it, because it is a life
form.
One of the more recent efforts of indigenous peoples for
recognition, or at least respect, for their laws includes joining in an
international treaty initiative ("Porto Alegre Treaty") along with over
250 organizations-including non-governmental organizations and
biotech activists such as Jeremy Rifkin-to convince national
governments around the world to adopt a treaty to establish the gene
pool as a global commons, not subject to patenting.' 4 In addition, at
the most recent session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Peoples, indigenous peoples issued a collective statement on and
recommendations for the protection of indigenous knowledge.'05
It is worth noting here that considerable effort is required for
indigenous peoples to find out, let alone challenge, such patents
because, unlike Western mega-businesses, they do not have the
resources to spend the millions of dollars that it can take to play the
patenting game today. In fact, even in developing countries,
10 6
smaller Western businesses generally do not have the resources to
spend the millions of dollars that it takes to play the patenting game
today either, particularly if the opposing side is a Western mega-
business. Therefore, smaller Western businesses can be squeezed out
of the economy because of their limited resources, rather than because
of any superior competitive edge that others, such as a mega-business,
possess. 107
However, smaller entrepreneurs like Miller, and even individual
businesspeople, can easily "trump" the needs and concerns of entire
indigenous communities in the area of patent law given the current
state of affairs. CIEL was initially "successful" in having Miller's
103. Wiser, supra note 87 (explaining that if one views each of the Declarations in the
note, one finds that signatories come from each continent on the globe).
104. Press Release, UKabc, Hundreds of NGOs from More than 50 Nations Announce
Support of a Treaty to Establish the Gene Pool as a Global Commons (Feb. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.ukabc.org/geneticcommons_treaty.htm.
105. Collective Statement of Indigenous Peoples on the Protection of Indigenous
Knowledge, Agenda to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (New York) (May 10-
21, 2004), available at http://ww.ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/pf2004.html.
106. COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter CIPR].
107. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099 (2000).
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patent cancelled but the PTO avoided the question raised by
indigenous peoples as to whether patents should be issued at all on
living organisms. 108 Miller later quietly applied for reconsideration of
his patent and was successful on the grounds that he had reproduced
an ayahuasca variety that came under the provisions of the PVPA, a
Congressionally gutting of the previously well-established "product
of nature" doctrine. 109
A report by the Commission on Intellectual Proeprty Rights
("CIPR") stated that CIEL was unable to comment on Miller's
arguments at this point since it was not covered by the new rules on
inter parte reexamination. 1° However, on its website in 2002, CIEL
charged that the PTO vigorously enforced this procedural restriction
against it while repeatedly allowing Miller to present new evidence
and arguments during his appeal, disregarding its own appellate
procedures,'" and demonstrating blatant favoritism towards Miller.
1 12
In addition, CIEL posted on its website a transcription of the PTO's
Statement of Reasons for Patentability and/or Confirmation.113 Glenn
Wiser, Staff Attorney for CIEL, stated that the PTO's reversal was
wrong as a matter of law because, among other things, the PTO
decided to apply plant patent infringement as the legal test on appeal
when the proper test, applied below, was whether the plant was
patentable.
114
Nation-states continue to act as facilitators for effectuating the
desires of multinational corporations. Monsanto and China have
gotten into the act; together, they are trying to produce the same kind
of naturally colored cotton, but through genetic engineering.' 15
108. Press Release, Center for International Environmental Law, U.S. Patent Office
Admits Error, Rejects Patent Claim on Sacred "Ayahuasca" Plant (Nov. 4, 1999), at
http://www.ciel.org/Biodiversity/AyahuascaRejectionPR.html.
109. See supra Part I.B.
110. CIPR, supra note 106, at 77.
111. Glenn Wiser, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Reinstates Ayahuasca Patent:
Flawed Decision Declares Open Season on Resources of Indigenous Peoples, Center for
International Environmental Law, June 25, 2001, at
http://www.ciel.org/Biodiversity/BiodiversitylntellectualProperty.html.
112. Wiser, supra note 87.
113. Notice of Intent to Issue Reexamination Certificate, available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/PTOExaminerTranscript.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2004);
see supra note 11, at 2.
114. Wiser, supra note 11, at 1. Wiser, supra note 87.
115. China has produced at least the green and brown "naturally" colored cotton. See
China Leads The World In Colored Cotton Development, SHANGHAI DAILY, July 22, 2003,
available at http://www.seedquest.com/News/releases/2003/july/6258.htm (last visited Nov. 26,
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However, genetic engineering is only being used because Monsanto
and China want to take out a patent on naturally colored cotton and
the mere insertion of another gene, no matter what that gene is, will
guarantee them a patent. Again, this is all done without regard to all
of the unknowns about the effects of such genetic engineering and in
spite of an ancient, fully-developed, viable alternative of a dazzling
array of colors that indigenous peoples produce with naturally colored
and naturally cultivated cotton. Naturally colored cotton, even more
so than the ayahuasca patent, illustrates how the current state of
Western patent law is spurring more and more genetic engineering
purely to make profit for multinational companies and their allies,
rather than to help the world, the poor, or the environment.
D. Naturally Colored Cotton
Naturally colored cotton provides a good example of how the
eviscerated product of nature doctrine within the U.S. has intersected
with indigenous intellectual property issues. Thus far, this
intersection has most commonly occurred between individual
businesspeople, government agencies, or corporations based in the
U.S. and one or more indigenous groups outside the U.S.11 6 The
example of naturally colored cotton further illustrates how Western
patent laws, and the economic policies that support them, often work
against indigenous economic systems and agriculture. Finally, the
example of naturally colored cotton illustrates how much indigenous
peoples and their traditional knowledge are often at the mercy of
Western business interests, which are supported by a dense network
of still-extant colonial laws and policies that have marginalized the
indigenous peoples within the nation-state.
This failure to decolonize law and policy with respect to
indigenous peoples is generally true even within developing countries
of the Americas where, potentially, the interests of those countries
and the indigenous groups within them might otherwise converge. In
this article, it will become readily apparent that the U.S. is an extreme
example of failure to decolonize internal law and policy while Peru
2004). China and Monsanto together have produced genetically modified insect-resistant
cotton. See Corrie Dosh, Planting Seeds of Profit, available at
http://www.adhitech.com/logan/menu_48/menu_54/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2004).
116. This can largely be explained by the fact that Euro-Americans within the U.S. have
wrung the indigenous peoples within their borders dry, as well as environmentally devastated
that country.
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will serve as an example of the very beginning of decolonization"' of
internal law and policy with respect to indigenous peoples.
For example, governments and social agencies routinely fail to
see the problems of indigenous peoples as related to any sort of
history and therefore, prefer to handle such problems in a cynical and
paternalistic way that has hardened into a pattern. 1 8 Linda Smith, a
decolonization theorist, Associate Professor in Education and Director
of the International Research Institute for Maori and Indigenous
Education at the University of Auckland, suggests that indigenous
researchers in particular take greater control over the ways in which
problems related to indigenous peoples are discussed and handled." 9
This involves a refraining of issues related to indigenous peoples by
making more conscious decisions in various aspects of one's research,
such as, the parameters of the problem, what is in the foreground and
background of the problem, and what shadings or complexities exist
within the frame. 1 20 Implementing this refraining process is related to
how the problem is defined as well as the determination of how best
to solve that problem.' 2' It may include, but is not limited to,
resistance to being boxed and labeled according to categories that do
not fit.' 
22
This failure of the U.S. to decolonize its internal laws and
policies vis-A-vis indigenous peoples within its own borders
encourages the privileging of individual and corporate Western
business interests over even the religious beliefs of entire groups of
indigenous peoples. As a result, many of the worldwide patent
controversies involving indigenous peoples have been conflicts over
the application of U.S. intellectual property laws.
117. LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 153 (Zed Books, 2001). The term "decolonization" is used here in the
same general sense that Linda Tuhiwai Smith does in her pivotal work on the relationship of
decolonization to research entitled, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous
Peoples. In this article, Smith's broad use of the term in reference to research in general is
applied specifically to analysis of specific U.S. patent law. Smith identifies several
methodologies related to the decolonization of one's research. One of these, called "reframing,"
is described in her book. Smith describes the process of "refraining" as an essential part of the
decolonization of research in general. She asserts that one of the reasons that many of the social
problems plaguing indigenous communities are not solved is because the issues are always
framed from a certain viewpoint, that of the colonizer.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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The controversy surrounding naturally colored cotton first came
to the attention of activists within the context of the international
debate over bio-piracy. Bio-piracy has been called a form "modem-
day imperialism"1 23 in which westernized researchers, often from the
U.S., travel to biologically diverse regions of the world for the
purpose of gleaning scientific knowledge from indigenous peoples on
their varied uses of local plants and animals. 124 These researchers
then return to their home countries with plant and animal samples and
obtain a patent on their "invention" by isolating a chemical
compound. 125 The temporary monopoly of the patent enables them to
reap profits from their "inventions" without sharing any monetary
benefits with indigenous peoples, 126 while the privileging that such
researchers enjoy enables them to forego even informally
acknowledging that indigenous peoples contributed to that
"invention." Bio-piracy is one of the typical issues facing the
biotechnology industry. 127
In the case of naturally colored cotton, it was an individual
businesswoman within the U.S. interested in organic agriculture, not a
biotech business, who obtained a plant patent for two varieties of
colored cotton, "coyote" (a brown color) and "green," neither of
which she invented. 28 Rather than traveling to another country, Ms.
Fox simply obtained her seeds from a United States Department of
Agriculture ("USDA") collection that in turn was obtained from
Mexico or some other part of Central America. 129  Indigenous
cultivators had already improved these seeds before the USDA
obtained them. 130 Ms. Fox merely continued planting and replanting
from amongst these already improved seeds to obtain the two shades
of brown and green that she wanted, a process also known as simple
plant breeding.' 31  In that sense, Sally Fox's "invention" was not
123. Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions About
Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69, 81 (2001) (arguing that TRIPS, and
the bio-piracy it encourages, have effectively resulted in the continued exploitation of
indigenous knowledge).
124. Id. at 70-71.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Bio-piracy: The Story of Natural Coloured Cottons of the Americas, ETC Group,
available at http://www.etcgroup.org/article.asp?newsid=219 (last visited Nov. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter Bio-piracy].
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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unlike the "invention" of the Stark Brothers. In addition, Fox's
strategy of getting a plant patent is something she shares in common
with Loren Miller, who obtained his plant patent for ayahuasca just
four years prior to Fox in 1986.
It is not clear how, or even if, the shades that Fox obtained were
different from the shades of brown and green that indigenous peoples
developed. Apparently, three years after Fox was awarded the plant
patent, and eleven years after she first began selectively breeding
seeds 132 obtained from the USDA, the National Cotton Council was
unimpressed by the results of her efforts. 133 These efforts included
replanting the seeds and selecting the subsequent generations of seeds
for lint color and fiber quality, with the primary intended purpose of
obtaining a staple size suitable for contemporary mechanized
spinning. 134 Arguably, Fox might have been entitled at that time to a
regular process patent for her self-proclaimed method of breeding
naturally colored cotton that was suitable for the large-scale
commercial clothing industry, if she had been successful.
Indeed, Fox claimed that the colored cotton that she bred would
be long enough for use in the contemporary machine spinning used in
the large-scale, Western commercial clothing industry. 35  However,
as will be discussed later, even almost fifteen years later, two things
remain unclear: (1) did Fox ever perfect such a method, or did she get
the longer length of cotton by obtaining the right cotton seeds 136 that
indigenous peoples have been cultivating for five thousand years and
growing them within the U.S. and (2) if she did indeed improve that
seed, was the method of improvement patentable?
The answer may be no to both questions. To date, Fox has not
taken out a process patent for her claimed method of producing
132. Sally Fox: Innovation in the Field, in DAVID BROWN, INVENTING MODERN AMERICA:
FROM THE MICROWAVE TO THE MOUSE (MIT Press 2001), available at
http://www.foxfibre.com/sallyfox-story.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
133. "What I've seen of her varieties has a long way to go, it doesn't look any different
from the USDA collections I saw 25-30 years ago. All she really shows is flower changes ....
It makes one wonder how much change she has really made." Bio-priacy, supra note 128
(quoting Dr. Philip Wakelyn, National Cotton Council, Washington, D.C., August 1993).
134: Id. (re-stating information provided in U.S. Plant Variety Protection Certificate
Numbers 8900170 and 8900169, Exhibit A, Section 14a, Breeding History, issued September
28, 1990).
135. Id.; see also Mary Bellis, Sally Fox and Natural Cotton, at
http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blfox.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
136. The two species of naturally colored cotton found in South and Central America, G.
barbadense and G. hirsutum, have medium to long lint lengths, while the species from Africa
and Asia have only short to medium lint lengths.
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naturally colored cotton suitable for machine spinning. This alone
raises questions about whether she ever succeeded in developing such
a method herself, but there are other questions that are even more
troubling. There are four species of cotton with different lint
lengths. 37 The two species found in Africa and Asia are Gossypium
arobreum and G. herbaceum; they have short to medium lint
lengths.138 The two species found in South and Central America, G.
barbadense and G. hirsutum, have medium to long lint lengths. 39
Accordingly, it appears that Fox may have simply stumbled upon,
rather than bred, the long lint length naturally colored cotton that
indigenous peoples had cultivated thousands of years ago.
In the meantime, the indigenous peoples of Peru succeeded in
developing their colored cotton for commercial markets where Sally
Fox did not. James M. Vreeland, an archaeologist working in Peru
with pre-Colombian textiles, created and co-directed the Native
Cotton Project ("Project") in 1982 with support from the Peruvian
ministries of labor and tourism, 140 the Inter-American Indian Institute
of the Organization of American States, and the Institute of Latin
American Studies of the University of Texas at Austin.14 1 A Peruvian
non-governmental organization ("NGO") 142  called Sociedad de
Investigaci6n de la Ciencia, Cultura y Arte Norteo ("SICAN")
137. James M. Vreeland, Jr., The Revival of Colored Cotton, 280 So. AM. 112, 116 (Apr.
1999), available at http://www.perunaturetex.com/scientif.htm.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 117.
141. James M. Vreeland, Jr., Ancient Alternative to Peru's Commercial Cotton Pesticide
Crisis, GLOBAL PESTICIDE CAMPAIGNER (Pesticide Action Network North America Regional
Center), May 1992, available at http://www.panna.org/resources/pestis/PESTIS.burst. I7.html.
142. AnNGOis
a not-for-profit, voluntary citizens' group, which is organized on a local, national
or international level to address issues in support of the public good. Task-
oriented and made up of people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety
of services and humanitarian functions, bring citizens' concerns to Governments,
monitor policy and programme implementation, and encourage participation of
civil society stakeholders at the community level. They provide analysis and
expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms and help monitor and implement
international agreements. Some are organized around specific issues, such as
human rights, the environment or health. Their relationship with offices and
agencies of the United Nations (UN) system differs depending on their goals,
their venue and their mandate.
NGOs and the United Nations Department of Public Information: Some Questions and Answers,
United Nations Department of Public Information, available at
http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosectionibrochure.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2004).
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became a sponsor in 1984.141 SICAN's goal was to use naturally
colored cotton as a rural development project for indigenous farmers
and traditional artisans.' 44 The Project estimated that as many as
15,000 traditional farmers still cultivated colored cotton varieties,
while over 50,000 women still spun and wove with it.
145
The Project began marketing commercially viable organic,
naturally colored cotton clothes, textiles, and other products in
1993, 146 the same year that Ms. Fox was developing "new" cotton
colors, which included mocha-brown and yellow-green. 47 Ms. Fox
accomplished this by planting and replanting germplasm, or seed,
samples that she obtained, this time from Texas A & M University.
48
Texas A & M, in turn, originally collected those seeds in Peru.149 By
1999, efforts similar to those of the Native Cotton Project in Peru
were being made in Columbia, Guatemala, and Bolivia.' 50 However,
no such efforts were occurring within the U.S. Rather, Fox was very
busy in building her organic naturally colored cotton business.
Today, Fox and her colleagues market various organic cotton
products under the tradename Fox Fibre, 51 including Fox Fibre yams
through Vreseis, Ltd.,152 Fox Fibre mattresses and sheets through
Athena Mills, 5 3 and Fox Fibre clothing through various other outlets.
Fox Fibre cotton is grown in several colors-including Buffalo
(mocha brown), Coyote (reddish brown), and Natural (white)-while
variations on these colors (such as beige, khaki, brown, red brown,
dark brown, and greens) are obtained by blending them with each
other or white. 54 Fox has apparently not developed the original seeds
that she obtained from the USDA and Texas A & M beyond the
colors extensively reported to have already existed as the result of the
thousands of years of effort of indigenous peoples.
143. Bio-piracy, supra note 128.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Bio-piracy, supra note 128.
150. Id.
151. Fox Fibre and Colour by Nature, Athena Mills, at
http://www.athenamills.com/foxfibre.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2004).
152. Fox Fibre Yarns, Vreseis, at http://www.vreseis.com/yarns.html (last visited Nov. 26,
2004).
153. Fox Fibre and Colour by Nature, supra note 151.
154. Id.
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The relevance of Fox's plant patent to this article lies in what it
reveals about the current state of patent law within the U.S. This state
of affairs in patent law may be traced back to the efforts of the Stark
Brothers, then back up to the more recent Newman-Rifkin patent
application for a half-human creature. Fox's plant patent also reveals
the legal strategies that businesspeople within the U.S. consciously
use to lay claim to indigenous inventions and traditional knowledge.
Fox acknowledges that naturally colored cotton "has its roots in
the ancient Americas. Weavers have cultivated and spun native
white, green, pink, lavender, yellow, red, and brown colored cottons
for thousands of years."' 155  Fox, via the Athena Mills website,
however, also implies that "the ancients" did not make much progress
in cultivating naturally colored cotton, as
[t]he entire palette of beautiful colors was not initially suited to
modem textile processing, mainly because of fiber characteristics
in wild-grown colorful cotton.... [Fox] has spent decades
carefully breeding and developing new lines of longer staple
naturally colored cotton, a stronger fiber than its ancient ancestor.
These cottons are bred with the fiber quality, spin-ability, and color
intensity necessary to suit today's industrial textile machinery.
156
This discourse reveals a sensibility in which it is acceptable to
appropriate and then negate the accomplishments of indigenous
peoples as long as one is from a superior race that is somehow
"improving" indigenous products.
However, since the indigenous peoples of Peru began marketing
commercially viable organic naturally colored cotton clothes, textiles,
and other products back in 1993, it is questionable whether Fox was
the first to "invent" colored cotton with either the necessary longer
staples for modem machinery or the fiber quality, spin-ability, or
color intensity preferred today. In fact, in 1993, her green cotton was
too short and weak to be spun alone, so it was blended with the
longest staple white cotton available. 157  In addition, Fox had a
competitor within the U.S., BC Cotton, as early as 1991. BC Cotton
developed its colored cotton line in the same way Fox did-by
obtaining seed samples from germplasm collected and held in places
like Texas A & M, the USDA, and University of California at
Berkeley.158 BC Cotton claimed to have developed red, brown, ivory,
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Bio-piracy, supra note 128.
158. Id.
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and green colored varieties, all of which would presumably be an
infringement on Fox's plant patent. 159 Yet, as discussed below, Fox
initiated and then voluntarily dismissed her lawsuit against BC
Cotton.
Fox then continued with her own efforts in building her business,
which eventually became quite successful. 160  Fox Fibre is also
naturally pest-resistant and produced without synthetic pesticides or
fertilizers.161 However, resistance to pests is yet another quality that
naturally colored cotton possessed long before Fox began her work.
162
In addition, virtually all naturally colored cotton produced by
indigenous peoples for thousands of years is still produced without
fertilizers or pesticides 163 even when they were faced with enormous
pressures to not do so anymore. For at least a century, the
government of Peru maintained a policy of oppressing indigenous
production of naturally colored cotton through various means,
including laws specifically aimed at destroying naturally-colored
cotton and quarantine measures designed to eliminate possible plant
"hosts" (i.e., naturally colored cotton) for cotton pests164 and possible
cross-pollination between white and colored cottons.
65
These laws and policies were supposed to protect the all-white
variety of cotton that was deemed to be more commercially viable.
166
In addition to using naturally pest-resistant varieties, indigenous
farmers used traditional, pre-Colombian systems of pest control and a
long-standing, successful tradition of crop rotation. 67  Both were
159. Id.
160. Over the years, in addition to monetary profits, Ms. Fox has received numerous
international accolades and awards for her efforts, including the United National Environmental
Programme Award for the Environment, the Edison Award for Most Innovative Company from
the American Marketing Association, the Green Housekeeping Award for Environmental
Leadership from the Good Housekeeping Association, the Organic Cotton Recognition Award
from the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements ("IFOAM"), the Discover
Award for Technological Innovation in the Environment, induction into the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Inventor's Circle, and coverage in print media, mainstream news,
worldwide documentary, and educational broadcasts. Fox Fibre and Colour by Nature, supra
note 151. Her awards for environmental stewardship resulted from the fact that her naturally
colored cotton is organically-grown, like that of indigenous peoples, but unlike BC Cotton,
which did not emphasize organic cotton production. Bio-piracy, supra note 128.
161. Sally Fox: Innovation in the Field, supra note 132.
162. Vreeland, supra note 137.
163. Bio-piracy, supra note 128 ("It is remarkably pest and disease resistant, and thrives in
marginal soils with little or no rainfall.").
164. Vreeland, supra note 137, at 117-18.
165. Bio-piracy, supra note 128.
166. Vreeland, supra note 137, at 117; Bio-piracy, supra note 128.
167. Vreeland, supra note 137, at 117-18.
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abandoned in the wake of the intense pressure created by Peruvian
laws and policies 68 that required farmers to cut down and destroy
perennial, and especially colored cotton at the end of each growing
season. 169
By 1931, the all-white variety favored in the U.S., which
required heavy inputs of synthetic pesticides and fertilizers, 70 had
become entrenched in Western commercial circles, and the Peruvian
government began issuing a series of laws aimed at destroying
naturally colored cotton. 171  "White"' 172 cotton was "cheaper" to
produce for several reasons: (1) it had a longer staple more suitable to
mechanized spinning, as previously discussed; (2) it required no
"specialized"' 173 [i.e., indigenous] harvesting techniques or facilities;
(3) environmentally toxic, heavy metal dyes could be used to dye
white cotton an unlimited number of other colors174; and (4) using
Western infrastructure, dyes, and pesticides for production of cotton
ensured that industrial agriculture reigned supreme and that its
proponents, Western capitalists inside and outside of Peru, would be
enriched rather than indigenous peoples.
The pest-control program implemented in the 1930's was
expensive, irreversibly eroded much of the genetic variation still
present earlier in the 20th century, and was an ill-conceived failure
that eventually severely threatened the survival of even the all-white
cotton as insects became resistant to the liberal amounts of pesticides
being applied. 175  By the 1990's, when Peru finally made the
eradication practice illegal, pesticide use remained extensive,
although insect pests had by then become so resistant to the pesticides
that experts estimated only one per cent of insect damage could be
controlled by them. 176 However, indigenous farmers in isolated areas
of Peru had continued growing "illicit" naturally colored cotton in
168. Id. at 117.
169. Bio-piracy, supra note 128.
170. Vreeland, supra note 137, at 116. Cotton farmers worldwide use approximately 23%
of the world's insecticides and 10% of the world's pesticides. Cotton farmers within the U.S.
alone use 35% of the total, making them the largest consumers of cotton pesticides, followed by
India at 11%. These insecticides and pesticides are among the longest-lived and most disruptive
to hormonal and reproductive systems.
171. Id. at 117.
172. Id. at 116. White cotton is usually bleached, using chlorine based processes that
result in production of dioxins.
173. Id. at 115.
174. Id. at 116.
175. Vreeland, supra note 137, at 117-18.
176. Id. at 118.
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spite of these pressures, 177 which enabled the Native Cotton Project to
rebuild stocks over the course of a decade or so of work.1
78
By 1993, some noted the irony in the fact that Sally Fox's patent
on naturally colored cotton would enable her to prevent Peruvian or
Central American farmers from obtaining samples of her seeds from
even a public seed bank, as she herself had done originally. 79 Yet,
there was never any lawsuit between Fox and indigenous peoples.
Instead, Fox herself filed a lawsuit in 1991 against Raymond Bird,
whose company, BC Cotton, was producing colored cotton in three
states by 1993.180
BC Cotton's colored cottons were developed from seed samples
from various universities and government gene banks, as were Fox's.
In her lawsuit, Fox claimed that BC Cotton infringed on her patent,
but she voluntarily dismissed the suit before 1994,18' perhaps because
she did not want the weakness of her claim exposed either in court or
to an international audience that has since showered her with
numerous awards and accolades for her efforts. After all, a company
spokesperson for BC Cotton had already bluntly declared, "[t]here is
colored cotton available in all the gene banks, it has been around for
years."'1 82 Perhaps she did not want to risk any further exposure of
how little she had actually accomplished; or, perhaps, she felt that she
was successful enough with her particular product, which unlike BC
Cotton's, was organic. 83 Or perhaps she simply did not want to incur
the expense of litigation regardless of the outcome.
Today, indigenous peoples of Peru continue to cultivate their
naturally colored cotton and bring it to a worldwide market under
several tradenames-Pakucho, Morrope, Native Cotton, and Vicuna
Cotton-as well as branching out into the production of organically-
produced alpaca.18 4 Patents such as Miller's on ayuhuasca and Fox's
on "her" varieties of naturally colored cotton, are examples of the
worst kind of protectionism, where power continually trumps need,
either directly, as in the case of Miller, or more indirectly, as in Fox's
case, where she and her business remain a strong force in the
177. Bio-piracy, supra note 128; Vreeland, supra note 137.
178. Vreeland, supra note 137, at 118.
179. Bio-piracy, supra note 128.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Peru Naturtex Partners, at www.perunaturtex.com/our.htm (last visited Nov. 26,
2004).
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naturally colored cotton industry within the U.S. In that sense, patent
law within the U.S. has morphed into a powerful instrument of
colonialism and American-style protectionism.
II. THE MORAL UTILITY REQUIREMENT-THE FRAYED CONNECTIVE
TISSUE OF PATENT LAW
As previously mentioned, the stage was being set for the
approval of Chakrabarty's patent application on a genetically-
engineered "oil-eating" bacterium well before Bergy. The
biotechnology industry was merely emulating an approach to
weakening patent law that had been successful back in 1930 with the
PPA. However, the times had indeed changed since then. Unlike
Spark Brothers Nursery and the ASTA, biotechnology proponents
were meeting organized resistance from a variety of quarters
comparatively early in the process. They therefore did not take the
direct approach of weakening the rest of the Patent Act through
explicit statutory law. Instead, biotechnology proponents took a very
effective back door route using the case law, which promised a much
quieter road to victory, largely outside the scrutiny of the public.
A. Playing Dodge Ball-Chakrabarty
Once again, an examination of the protagonists in this case is
useful. The real party in interest in Chakrabarty was General Electric
Company, to whom Ananda M. Chakrabarty's application was
assigned. 185 The application was to patent a "human-made, genetically
engineered bacterium.., capable of breaking down multiple
components of crude oil.' 186 Patents were requested on three things:
(1) the method of producing the bacterium in the first place; (2) "an
inoculum comprised of a carrier material floating on water, such as
straw, and the new bacteria;"'' 87 and (3) "the bacteria themselves."'' 88
The patent examiner accepted the first two, but rejected the attempt to
patent the bacteria themselves as a "product of nature" and therefore
not patentable under the Patent Act. 8 9 The examiner also rejected the
claim on the ground that living things are not patentable subject
matter. 90  Bacteria are not classified as asexually or sexually
185. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 306.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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reproducing plants so neither the then-existing PPA nor the PVPA
were applicable.
In Chakrabarty, the PTO returned to the well-established
"product of nature" doctrine to initially reject the attempt to patent the
genetically engineered bacteria itself.'9' The Patent Office Board of
Appeals affirmed on the same rationale that living matter is not
patentable subject matter but rejected the other ground, that the
micro-organisms were "products of nature."'1 92  However, the
C.C.P.A. reversed by a divided vote, relying on its rationale in In re
Bergy.193 In doing so, the C.C.P.A. paved the way for Chakrabarty
and its progeny on the slimmest of reasons, ignoring the enormous
implications of treating a living organism, no matter how tiny, as if it
were identical to a nonliving chemical or mineral.
1 94
As in Bergy, several amicus briefs were filed in Chakrabarty.
This time, however, there were opposing briefs from several
noteworthy quarters. The amicus briefs included the statements of
"[s]cientists, among them Nobel laureates,"'195 who predicted that a
parade of horrors would result from granting the patent application,
including "that genetic research may pose a serious threat to the
human race,.... spread pollution and disease,... [and] result in a loss
of genetic diversity."'' 96 These significant concerns were expressly
noted in the Court's decision, yet the Court specifically rejected the
challenge of addressing those concerns in its ruling. Rather, Chief
Justice Berger wrote, "It is argued that this Court should weigh these
potential hazards in considering whether respondent's invention is
patentable subject matter under § 101. We disagree."' 97 The Court,
however, declined to say why it disagreed. Thus, the Court did not
examine whether genetically engineered living organism ought to be
patentable.
In spite of declining to weigh the significant concerns expressed
in the amicus briefs and by the PTO surrounding competing
economic, social, and scientific considerations, the majority only
191. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Daniel, supra note 60. As Daniel observes, at least one commentator has
criticized the C.C.P.A. for consolidating Bergy and Chakrabarty for reconsideration since a case
involving the purification of a micro-organism can be distinguished from one involving a
genetically-modified organism-organism.
195. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 316-17.
2005] WESTERN NOTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 419
upheld Chakrabarty's patent on the genetically-engineered bacterium
itself in a 5 to 4 plurality decision. The decision to decline to weigh
those concerns is striking. In writing for the Court, Justice Burger
clearly recognized that allowing patentability would at the very least
accelerate genetic engineering research efforts in that direction.1
98
This acceleration of research in one direction, i.e., only the most
profitable one where patents can be obtained most readily, is precisely
what Kloppenburg, Professor of Rural Sociology at University of
Wisconsin-Madison, later observed in his book, First the Seed, as
being neither desirable (particularly for the Third World, but also in
the directions in which it forced U.S. agriculture) nor inevitable.' 99
As Burger correctly observes, the legislative process is generally
better equipped to investigate, examine, study, and promulgate "a
matter of high policy" into law. 200 However, this should not have
stopped the Court from exercising caution, as Justice Brennan noted
in his dissent, when the "patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation's
deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage
progress," particularly if that monopoly is going to be on the living
organism itself 201 Indeed, the mere existence of a plurality decision,
particularly one in which the Court winds up urging Congress to take
action, reveals a deep ambivalence among those writing for the Court
about the holding.
Justice Burger's comment that, "we are without competence to
entertain these arguments-either to brush them aside as fantasies
generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them' 202 seems beside
the point, and perhaps more of an attempt to absolve the Court from
responsibility. Vacating Bergy in light of a case like Flook, which did
not involve any living micro-organisms, and without any guidance to
the lower court on Flook's possible applicability to a case involving a
purified micro-organism, buttresses the Court's conclusion. The
Court recognized the dangers of allowing patentability in
Chakrabarty, and felt deep ambivalence about it, as reflected in the
plurality decision, but decided to deflect all responsibility to Congress
and the Executive branch. 0 3
198. Id. at 317.
199. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 51, at xi-xv.
200. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317.
201. Id. at 318-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 317.
203. Id. at 318.
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One might argue that the mere existence of a plurality decision
was the Court's exercise of caution. However, subsequent events
have proven otherwise. Biotechnology proponents have had a field
day with Diamond v. Chakrabarty. They repeatedly point to a
quotation from P.J. Federico, a principal draftsman of a 1952
recodification of the Patent Act, that Burger uses in his opinion as
evidence of what they characterize as the Court's strong support of
the patentability of genetically-engineered organisms:
The Committee Reports accompanying the [recodification] of the
1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter
to "include anything under the sun that is made by man."
20
More consistently ignored are the deep misgivings expressed in
the majority as well as the minority opinion about patentability of
microorganisms in this context as commentators, both legal 205 and
lay, have overwhelmingly and repeatedly hailed Chakrabarty as a
definitive Supreme Court stamp of approval on genetic engineering
and biotechnology.
20 6
Justice Burger even went so far as to emphasize that the Court
was not judging whether genetically-engineered animals should be
patented but merely whether the language of the Patent Act included
allowing the patentability of living organisms.20 7 He specifically
invited Congress to amend Section 101 accordingly. 20 8 Furthermore,
Burger highlighted the fact that the public good can and should be a
part of patent law. He included one example of this in his opinion, 42
U.S.C. § 2181(a), which denies patent protection to inventions that
are "useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or
atomic energy in an atomic weapon." 209  Today, another example
exists in 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), which exempts from liability for patent
infringement any "medical practitioner" who performs a "medical
activity," a provision that attempts to free medical practices from the
204. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REp. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6
(1952)).
205. As recently as 1999, one such commentator, James P. Daniel, cited supra note 60,
characterizes Chakrabarty's language as "strong" as he argues that the moral utility requirement
in patent law is "dead doctrine" and that only Congress should address concerns about the
consequences of granting patents for human-based inventions.
206. However, one legal commentator has recognized the fact that Chakrabarty was a
plurality decision. See, e.g., Barry S. Edwards, "... and on his farm he had a geep ": Patenting
Transgenic Animals, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 89 (2001) (analyzing the impact of the case
on the proliferation of transgenic animal patents).
207. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318.
208. Id.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318.
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vagaries of patent law for the benefit of society.21 ° Years before the
promulgation of § 287(c), Burger made his observations, even as he
tried to deflect attention away from the Court's own failure to
exercise more caution in its decision.
Since 1980, the PTO has relied on the Chakrabarty plurality
decision to grant patents on non-naturally occurring man-made
multicellular plants and other non-human multicellular organisms,
many of them genetically engineered plants and animals, such as the
famous genetically engineered Harvard Onco-mouse patent. The
Harvard onco-mouse became a patentable invention by virtue of
genetic engineering in which foreign genes were inserted into a
naturally-occurring mouse. The litigation strategy surrounding such
genetically engineered organisms has proven to be very effective, as
biotechnology opponents find themselves unable to marshal the vast
quantities of money that are needed to sustain protracted litigation,
particularly before a decidedly pro-business judiciary.2 1  In the
meantime, patenting of life forms, and the focus of genetic-
engineering research, has moved inexorably up the food chain, from
micro-organisms to transgenic animal patents, and finally to the very
real possibility of half-human chimeras.
Biotechnology apologists seek to ignore the broader contexts
into which commentators such as Kloppenburg, Barry Edwards,
indigenous peoples, and even Justice Burger in the Chakrabarty
decision, have clearly placed it. The present Supreme Court, as
currently constituted, claims ignorance of these broader contexts as
well. The Court cites Kloppenburg and Cary Fowler's work on the
PPA and the PVPA in J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc.,212 a more recent decision expressly holding that
newly developed plant breeds are patentable subject matter under
213§101 of the Patent Act. Importantly, as pointed out in the JE.M
Ag Supply dissent, there are no seed-saving or research exemptions at
all outside of the PPA and PVPA under the utility patent provisions of
210. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1999).
211. Edwards traces this path from Chakrabarty to Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,
932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991) and on through to the Newman-Rifkin patent application. He
concludes that growing public concern over transgenic animal patents may result in a
reemergence of the moral utility requirement in patent law as well as defmitive Congressional
action on the issue. Edwards, supra note 206.
212. 534 U.S. 124, 137 (2001).
213. Id. at 145.
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§ 101, making the negative impact of JEM Ag Supply on seed-saving
214and research potentially enormous.
Ironically, in Chakrabarty, Justice Burger's punt of the
significant concerns expressed by the PTO and in amicus briefs out of
the hands of the Court was unjustified at an even deeper level in the
215
area of patents. Patent law has long had a moral utility requirement
that dates from shortly after the Patent Act was first passed in 1793.
As noted by Edwards, the moral utility requirement is a common law
doctrine that can be traced to the 1817 decision of Lowell v. Lewis.2t 6
B. Origins & Development of the Moral Utility Requirement
In Lowell, Justice Story declared that, "[a]ll that the law requires
is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-
being, good policy, or sound morals of society. '21 7 "The word
'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to
mischievous or immoral."2t 8 Story gave several examples of such an
invention, such as, "a new invention to poison people, or to promote
debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination., 21 9 At one time, it
was fairly common for the word "moral" to be read into the "utility"
element of the Patent Act, resulting in the denial of patents on
gambling devices and other inventions historically frowned upon by
society at large.220
Thus, Justice Story was and still is considered to be the father of
the moral utility requirement. 221 He was also one of the principal
architects of pivotal federal Indian case law, including the infamous
222
Marshall Trilogy223 of cases. This factor shall be discussed in more
detail later in relation to the contemporaneous development of the
geographical limitation in U.S. patent law.
214. Id. at 154-55.
215. Moral utility concerns also inform other areas of intellectual property, such as the
recent Redskins trademark case. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
216. 15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
217. Id. at 1019.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Edwards, supra note 206, at 112.
221. Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The
Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 691 (2004).
222. Infamous at least within the discipline of federal Indian law.
223. The Marshall Trilogy is a set of three Supreme Court cases considered to be pivotal in
the development of federal Indian law. They are Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832),
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) and Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
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While Justice Story's interpretation of the moral utility
requirement has been largely abandoned in the U.S.,224 European
patent law during the same time retained similar requirements in its
patent law. Edwards posits the possible re-emergence of the moral
utility requirement within U.S. patent law in the area of transgenic
animal patents.225  However, such re-emergence should not be
confined to transgenic animal patents. Kloppenburg has already
identified in detail the same kinds of concerns in the PPA of 1930 and
the PVPA of 1970 that Justice Burger invited Congress to address in
the rest of the Patent Act. 226  Therefore, any re-emergence of the
moral utility in patent law should include concerns expressed about
patenting of all life forms, from the PPA of 1930 through the PVPA
of 1970 to the patenting of micro-organisms.
Such interpretations of the moral utility requirement have been
largely abandoned in the 20th century within the U.S., prompting
commentators to argue that the doctrine is archaic and unreasonable
to apply to genetically-engineered organisms, including the chimera
227proposed in the Newman-Rifkin patent application. However, the
moral utility requirement never completely disappeared from patent
law within the U.S. and has been more explicitly evoked in the patent
law of the European community in recent years. A modern model of
the doctrine has long existed in the European Patent Convention
("EPC"). 228
Furthermore, as recently as 1991, the Federal Circuit quoted
Justice Story's "sound morals" language to define "utility" in the
case, Tol-o-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing
Gesellschaft.2 29 Even more significantly, in 1998, the PTO cited both
Lowell and Tol-o-Matic in a "Media Advisory" that specifically
addressed the possibility that the PTO would reject transgenic patents
on moral grounds in the case of the Newman-Rifkin patent
210
application on a human/nonhuman chimera.
224. Magnani, supra note 4, at 451-54 (citing DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 4.03 (1998)).
225. See Edwards, supra note 206.
226. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 304 (1980).
227. See, e.g., Magnani, supra note 4.
228. Enerson, supra note 221 (explaining that the Convention specifically prohibits
patenting of "ethically questionable practices," touching off a lively public debate on the
advisability of allowing patent protection on genetically engineered plants and animals. Such a
public debate has been noticeably absent in the United States.).
229. 945 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
230. Edwards, supra note 206, at 113.
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Ill. CONVERGING SOCIOECONOMIC, SAFETY, AND ETHICAL
CONCERNS?
A. A Trilogy of Western Concerns
Edwards effectively summarizes the many socioeconomic,
safety, and ethical concerns that legal commentators have been raising
about other implications of plant and animal patenting, including:
1. Previously Unknown Allergic Reactions: In 1999,
"Pioneer Hi-Bred, International asked a University of
Nebraska scientist to test a variety of soybean seed into
which a Brazil nut gene had been introduced (to increase
the bean's protein level). The scientist discovered that
the soybean caused an allergic reaction in people with
Brazil nut allergies", 231;
2. Unexpected Results: "[S]cientists at Cornell University
discovered that corn that had been genetically altered to
produce an insecticide released pollen on nearby plants
with the unexpected result of killing monarch butterfly
larvae, potentially threatening the entire monarch
butterfly population as well as threatening the plants and
animals that rely on the monarchs" 232 ;
3. Unintended Side Effects (animals): "Some of the
transgenic animals being produced have exhibited
horrible side effects, such as the pig with a human growth
gene that unexpectedly grew to be 'excessively hairy,
riddled with arthritis, and cross-eyed,' seldom even
standing up" 233;
4. Should Animals be Patentable "Things" and Are
Transgenic Animals Safe?: Could they pollute gene
pools, biodiversity, and ecosystems?
234
Kloppenburg makes parallel arguments about allowing plant
patenting with respect to the socioeconomic ramifications within and
outside the U.S. 235 The PPA of 1930 and the PVPA of 1970 were
231. Id. at 91.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 92.
234. Id. at 103-07.
235. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 51.
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essentially Congressional stamps of approval on agribusiness and its
dependence on indistinguishable plant varieties, and hybridized
plants, which are sterile and require heavy inputs of Western-
produced chemicals and fertilizers for their production. It is worth
noting that, although the PVPA and the PPA were directed at certain
kinds of plants that were artificially increasing the profitability of
mechanized, hybridized agriculture, farmers unconnected to mega-
agribusiness were up in arms over the extension of PPA-like patent
protection to sexually-reproduced plants under the PVPA. A farmer's
exemption to the PVPA was enacted in recognition of the serious
detrimental impact of the PVPA on the nation's medium to small-
sized, or family, farms.2 36 However, its beneficial effect for small,
family farms has been minimal given the massive socioeconomic
machinations that Kloppenburg describes.
B. Proposed Legal Changes
It is important to note here that indigenous peoples were not a
part of the process of either passage of the PPA, the PVPA, nor the
debate surrounding the farmer's exemption to the PVPA. These were
all directed at the non-Indian farmers who had displaced and occupied
the lands of the indigenous peoples within the U.S., direct
beneficiaries of overt genocidal Manifest Destiny policies2 37 that were
just concluding as the forces that led to the passage of the PPA were
gathering momentum. Before the "American" farmer was largely
displaced by mega-agribusiness, the extensive displacement and
intentional destruction of American Indian agriculture occurred on the
same lands. The displacement and destruction of American Indian
agriculture, as well as their other achievements within the U.S., are
routinely ignored at both academic and lay levels:
This hostile attitude of stubbornly determined ignorance, it should
be noted, is not confined to textbook writers. Recently, three
highly praised books of scholarship on early American history by
eminent Harvard historians Oscar Handlin and Bernard Bailyn
have referred to thoroughly populated and agriculturally cultivated
Indian territories as "empty space," "wilderness," "vast chaos,"
"unopened lands," and the ubiquitous "virgin land" that blissfully
was awaiting European "exploitation". .. . The Eurocentric racial
contempt for the indigenous peoples of North and South America,
236. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1982); Mark W. Lauroesch, Genetic Engineering: Innovation and
Risk Minimization, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 100, 113 (1988).
237. See generally DAVID E. STANNARD, THE AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS AND
THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD (Oxford University Press 1992).
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as well as Africa, that is reflected in scholarly writings of this sort
is now so complete and second nature to most Americans that it
has passed into popular lore and common knowledge of the "every
schoolboy knows" variety. No intent to distort the truth is any
longer necessary. All that is required is the recitation of rote
learning as it passes from one uncritical generation to the next.
238
"Stubbornly determined ignorance" characterizes the debate on
Western intellectual property law and the traditional knowledge of
indigenous peoples. This kind of ignorance pervades scholarly
discourse in this topic area to such an extent that even proposed legal
changes that are perceived to be friendly toward the interests of
indigenous peoples completely miss important linkages between U.S.
law and policy toward Indians within its borders and the development
of U.S. patent law. Instead, intellectual property issues in relation to
indigenous peoples outside the U.S. are discussed as if the U.S. itself
did not have indigenous peoples either in its past or present.
1. The Marshall Trilogy Connection
Like the moral utility requirement, the yawning gap in
intellectual property discourse and legal scholarship may be traced
back to Justice Story and his colleagues on the U.S. Supreme Court.
Justice Story was on the bench when the first case in the Marshall
Trilogy, Johnson v. McIntosh,2 39 was decided. The task before the
Supreme Court in that case was to determine whether pre-
Revolutionary War land transfers involving European powers, private
individuals, and Indian tribes were still valid given sales of the same
lands by the newly-formed United States. Out of Johnson v.
McIntosh, which pre-Revolutionary War landowners lost, came
American legal recognition of the discovery doctrine, under which the
Court decided that European "discovery" of America justified all land
title under U.S. law. 240 The Court did this without any consideration
of whether it was morally legitimate to apply the doctrine centuries
later, and without definitively declaring that the Indians had no title at
all as a result.24' Instead, the Court decided that the discovery
doctrine gave the federal government the exclusive right to extinguish
aboriginal title "by purchase or conquest.'
242
238. Id. at 12-13.
239. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
240. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 69
(4th ed. 1998).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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In 1947, Felix Cohen, an early, prominent Indian law scholar,
referred to this result as a "a cruel dilemma: either Indians had no title
and no rights or the Federal land grants on which much of our
economy rested were void., 243 More recent commentary asserts that
this result supposedly avoided "two logical extremes," namely that
the discovery doctrine somehow extinguished all Indian title versus
Euro-American acceptance that Indians held fee title to all their lands,
completely unaffected by European discovery.
244
Both views are analytically too shallow, particularly in light of
the evolution of U.S. patent law during that same era. The decision
reveals far more about the Euro-American need to rationalize greed,
theft, and genocide than any "logical extremes" or "cruel
dilemma(s)." As such, it provides important clues about the legal
tenor of the country at that time, when American recognition of global
prior art was about to morph into a geographical limitation.
The "globe" in "global prior art" was from a bygone era when
Euro-Americans were not sure that they would be able to overcome
the Indian tribes. Respect for and recognition of global prior art at
that time was in this context. As Euro-Americans came to the
realization that they were winning more wars against Indians and had
the potential to sweep even further across this continent, they did not
feel that they needed to respect the entire globe's prior art, only
Europe's-the most recent rival for colonial spoils-and any other
nation-state that might have the power to object and/or retaliate in a
way that Euro-Americans could understand.
Given this pivotal change in the Euro-American relationship to
the indigenous peoples within what is now the United States, the
Patent Act was modified accordingly. There was no need to articulate
the reasons for the change in writing because the entire country was
already agog by that time with the economic ramifications of the
Marshall Trilogy. Instead of legal recognition of global prior art, a
geographical limitation language was now more economically
expedient. Of course, Euro-Americans were ever mindful of their
erstwhile colonial rivals, so the definition of prior art was crafted to
encompass them while leaving open the possibility that even more
colonial booty might fall into the hands of Euro-American
"inventors."
If one keeps in mind the state of colonization of the Americas at
the time global prior art still existed in the Patent Act and examines
243. Id.
244. Id.
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the changes in the statutory language from global prior art to a
geographical limitation during the time of the Marshall Trilogy and
Manifest Destiny, this becomes more apparent. The geographical
limitation language of the Patent Act arose at a time when conquest
was so nearly complete that Euro-Americans could taste it. A
geographical limitation crafted in precisely the language that came to
be used in the Patent Act was a logical outgrowth of Johnson v.
McIntosh, a jurisprudence that "ensured that future acts of genocide
would proceed on a rationalized, legal basis.
' 245
Justice Story assumed what initially seemed to be a more
iconoclastic position in the second of the Marshall Trilogy cases,
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.24  This 1831 decision is frequently
relied upon today in federal Indian law despite the fact that the
decision was a 2-2-2 split, as one of the justices was absent.2 47
Courts, and often legal commentators as well, simply take dicta from
one of the minority decisions,248 a.k.a. "Marshall's opinion,"249 that is
most unfavorable to the tribes, largely ignoring the fact and
implications of the 2-2-2 split. Cherokee Nation thus inaugurates into
psuedo-legal precedent the-we'll-just-ignore-Indian-issues-and-
they'll-go-away syndrome (hereinafter "syndrome") that has
continued to prevail in federal Indian jurisprudence into the 21st
century.
In contrast to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in the case,
Justice Story, along with Justice Thompson, concluded that the
Cherokee Nation was indeed a foreign nation that therefore possessed
sovereignty in the international sense.25° Yet it is Marshall's opinion
that is most frequently relied upon as the actual decision of Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia.251  Analysis of the prevailing discussion and
proposals today surrounding indigenous peoples and intellectual
property issues demonstrate how deeply this syndrome insidiously
permeates the rest of American jurisprudence in a way that legal
scholars have ignored for too long. Further analysis of the impact of
the tenor and effect of the Marshall Trilogy cases in shaping pivotal
contemporaneous changes in the Patent Act is critical.
245. Id. at 71 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
246. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
247. GETCHES, supra note 240, at 111.
248. Id. at 104.
249. Marshall's Plan, named after Chief Justice Marshall.
250. GETCHES, supra note 240, at 110.
251. Id.
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For example, the conventional wisdom is that Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia establishes a very important foundation of the federal-
tribal relationship25 2-that Indian tribes "may, more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations"2 53 rather than
"foreign nations" within the meaning of Article III, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution.254 The case, in which the Cherokee
Nation petitioned the Supreme Court to decide that the laws of the
state of Georgia had no force within their treaty-guaranteed
255reservation, was actually dismissed as not being within the
256Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in keeping with the
continuation of the syndrome, Marshall's hedging language in dicta
on domestic dependent nations has calcified into legal precedent and
the contrary decision of Justice Story remains largely ignored outside
federal Indian law. Inside federal Indian law, Story's decision is
viewed as revealing deep ideological divisions within the Court and
Euro-American society itself at that time.
5 7
Since Marshall's position on Indians as domestic dependent
nations was only expressed in dicta, and in hesitant language at that, it
is questionable whether the ideological divisions over tribal
sovereignty and self-determination were so deep at that time. Rather,
it seems more likely that Marshall's hesitant dicta merely reflected
lingering Euro-American doubt about whether their imperialistic
endeavor would "stick" even among the more assimilated Cherokees,
whose movement "from the hunter state to a more fixed state of
society' 258 was viewed by Justice Johnson, nevertheless, as an
intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the United States and
Georgia.259  I would suggest that the only significant ideological
division was how best to nail down Euro-American hegemony. Also
overlooked is the fact that Justice Story was an important figure in the
development of U.S. patent law, particularly in the development of
the moral utility requirement. Story's views of the indigenous
252. Id. at 104.
253. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
254. GETCHES, supra note 240, at 104.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 69.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 111. This statement was already a gross distortion of the nature of Cherokee
society, which depended heavily on the agricultural pursuits of the women as much, if not more
than the hunting ability of the men prior to European arrival. In addition, Cherokees were not
nomadic as Justice Johnson implies, as they resided in fixed towns. Id. at 111.
259. GETCHES, supra note 240, AT 111.
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peoples within the U.S. have not been examined, although the
Marshall Trilogy "was, by all accounts, one of the greatest
constitutional crises in the history of the nation," 260 despite being
contemporaneous with Story's construction of the moral utility
requirement as well as the first appearance of the geographical
limitation in patent law.
An address that Justice Story gave in 1828 during the
commemoration of the first European settlement of Salem,
Massachusetts is revealing. They were "incapable of assimilation"
with Western culture, their "ferocious passions, their independent
spirit, [and] their wandering life" were a challenge to white society by
their mere presence, raising the question "whether the country itself
shall be abandoned by civilized man, or maintained by his sword as
the right of the strongest.
261
While it is clear what Story thought of the future of the
American Indian was within the U.S., there is no indication that
Justice Story's position on the status of American Indians as foreign
nations had changed by 1832, when the Supreme Court decided
Worcester v. Georgia.262 In that case, the Court, with the exception of
Justice Baldwin, decided that Georgia's law had no effect within
Cherokee territory.263 The majority decision in Worcester v. Georgia
was therefore in complete harmony with Story's previous decision in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that the Cherokees were a foreign nation
within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.264
Ordinarily, the decision would have had the effect of
accomplishing the release of Samuel A. Worcester and several other
missionaries who were arrested by the state of Georgia for violating a
state law that required any non-Indian resident of the Cherokee
territory to get a license from the governor.265  However, a
presidential and state nullification controversy was brewing 266 in the
aftermath of the discovery of gold267 on Cherokee land. 26' The fact
260. Id. at 102.
261. Id. at 103.
262. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
263. Id. at561.
264. Id. at 552 (stating that Justice Story concurs with Justice Thompson's opinion).
265. GETCHES, supra note 240, at 113.
266. See id. at 122.
267. Id. at 126. Indeed, the first U.S. Mint was situated in Cherokee territory, and the
origin of the name of the Georgia town of Dahlonega, site of the largest (and purest) gold
deposit in the United States east of the Mississippi, is in a Cherokee word that refers to the
yellow color of gold of that region. See Dahlonega, at
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that the case was widely reported and debated in the press
269
underscores how interested the lay Euro-American public was in the
outcome.
Ultimately, the Court decided that Georgia laws had no effect in
Cherokee territory, to which Horace Greeley reported that President
Jackson responded, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let
him enforce it. '270  While some authorities doubt whether Jackson
actually said those precise words, it is clear that the prospect of
Presidential nullification of a Supreme Court decision precipitated a
constitutional clash of the highest order, and that Jackson actively
fueled the Cherokee-Georgia conflict, supported Georgia's claimed
sovereignty over Cherokee territory, and enthusiastically
implemented the removal of the Cherokees westward to Indian
Territory, now known as the state of Oklahoma.27" ' In the aftermath of
Worcester v. Georgia the missionaries agreed to accept pardons that
were offered by the Georgia governor at Jackson's behest, Story and
Marshall kissed and made up with President Jackson,272 and the
Cherokees were removed, along with the other so-called Five
Civilized Tribes. 273 The decision in Worcester became the most cited
pre-Civil War Supreme Court case besides Marbury v. Madison,
274
McCulloch v. Maryland,275 and United States v. Perez,276 yet the
modem "trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward a reliance on
http://roadsidegeorgia.com/city/dahlonega.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
268. GETCHES, supra note 240, at 126.
269. See id. at 123.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Story reported that,
Notwithstanding [that] I am "the most dangerous man in America," the President
specially invited me to drink a glass of wine with him. But what is more
remarkable, since his last Proclamation and Message, the Chief Justice and
myself have become his wannest supporters and shall continue so just as long as
he maintains the principles contained in them. Who would have dreamed of such
an occurrence?
Id.
273. The Five Civilized Tribes were the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and
Seminoles of the southeastern United States, so named because of their own efforts to assimilate
to the satisfaction of white society, even to the point of adopting plantation-style slavery among
a predominant and heavily mixed-white minority that had arisen within each tribe.
274. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
275. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
276. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824); GETCHES, supra note 240, at 125.
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federal preemption. ''277  This trend is concurrent with a strong
tendency of legal scholars to completely ignore all of the Marshall
Trilogy outside of the field of federal Indian law.
Ignorance and neglect of basic federal Indian law among legal
scholars within the U.S. outside of that esoteric field metamorphoses
into outright animosity in the rest of the Americas. The ayahuasca
patent case provides a unique illustration of how continuing
displacement and marginalization of indigenous peoples in the rest of
the Americas, and appropriation of the consequent spoils has played
out within a patent law system that currently refuses to examine itself
critically within the context of the moral utility requirement.
Furthermore, in spite of the seeming obscurity of these issues to most
of the legal academy within the U.S., there have been concerted
efforts toward final and universally accepted solutions for the
protection and promotion of traditional knowledge spanning two
decades, but with no result.
278
Why? To answer this question, we must first examine some of
the proposed, but not accepted, solutions that have emerged within
that time frame. Proposals for change within U.S. patent law have
included reviving the arguably defunct moral utility requirement
279
and expanding what is recognized within U.S. patent law as prior
art.28° Other proposals have been made with regard to international
law, but have required the not-forthcoming approval of the U.S., such
as expanding the use of geographic indications in TRIPS,28' signing
off on the Convention on Biological Diversity,282 and/or recognizing
the whole area of traditional knowledge as sui generis.
283
2. Possibilities Within the Moral Utility Requirement
Commentary surrounding the pros and cons of reviving the
moral utility requirement in U.S. patent law has included and
excluded consideration of possible effects on traditional knowledge.
Nevertheless, both forms of commentary-excluding and including
indigenous peoples-have great significance on the ultimate
resolution of questions surrounding western use of indigenous
277. Id. (quoting McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 172
(1973)).
278. CIPR, supra note 106, at 73.
279. Fecteau, supra note 123, at 92.
280. See Bagley, supra note 2.
281. CIPR, supra note 106, at 87-90.
282. Id. at 84-85.
283. Id. at 79-80.
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traditional knowledge. Leanne Fecteau, CIEL, and even the media at
one point284 have noted the seeming convergence of Western debate
about the significance of the moral utility requirement in the
attempted patenting of an animal-human chimera and the religious
issues raised by CIEL before the PTO in the ayahuasca patent
controversy.28 5
This seeming convergence raised hope in some quarters that a
newly-revived moral utility requirement in patent law would spark
public debate about the significance of patenting half-human
"inventions" as well as the morality of allowing a patent to stand that
of itself violates the religious beliefs of indigenous peoples of the
Amazon. This sort of "convergence theory" is not unique to
biotechnology critics or advocates for indigenous peoples. Derrick
Bell has noted that blacks within the U.S. have been able to achieve
success in civil rights only when their interests have managed to
converge with those of whites. 28 6 At any other time, -i.e., when their
interests do not somehow converge with those of whites, blacks can
forget about recognition of their civil rights within the U.S.
The vagaries and overall ineffectiveness of using convergence
theory to effectuate goals that are not shared by the majority is even
more pronounced for indigenous peoples of the Americas. They are a
much smaller minority within the U.S. than blacks, thanks to a
genocidal reduction in their numbers and wave after wave of carefully
orchestrated European immigration in its wake, as documented by
David E. Stannard, Professor of American Studies at the University of
Hawaii. Stannard chose to go straight to the point by titling the book,
American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New
World.287 As a direct result of the American Holocaust described in
that book, American Indians still have comparatively less political
clout than American blacks 288 and therefore, even less possibility of
fortuitous convergence with white interests in the legal arena. Outside
the U.S. and Canada, where the numbers of survivors of the American
Holocaust remain higher, indigenous peoples of the Americas often
284. Fecteau, supra note 123, at 89-92; Wiser, supra note 87; Weiss, supra note 24.
285. See, e.g., Fecteau, supra note 123, at 92.
286. Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled
Hopes for Racial Reform, Remarks at the 8th Annual Hager Distinguished Lecture/Oklahoma
Lecture in the Humanities, University of Tulsa College of Law (March 5, 2004).
287. STANNARD, supra note 237.
288. This is true in spite of recent evidence that the "Indian vote" within the U.S. might
have some regional political clout in states such as New Mexico and the Dakotas, and the
possibility of deciding a very, very close Presidential election, such as Bush/Gore in 2000.
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consider themselves lucky when they. are not the subject of genocide
today when there are "too many" survivors.
Given these realities, it was fairly predictable that the interests of
indigenous peoples and that of the dominant society either would not
converge, or the specific concerns of indigenous peoples would be
ignored, in spite of any convergence. As it turned out, the potential
convergence was effectively cut off by subsequent events. As
previously noted, while the PTO rejected the Newman-Rifkin half-
human patent application in June of 1999, it carefully avoided
considering the religious implications of the ayahuasca patent on the
moral utility requirement in the following year.
The moral utility requirement has not been definitively revived
in general. Despite the PTO's rejection of the Newman-Rifkin patent
application on a half-human creature as unpatentable because it
"embrace[d]" a human being,289 the consequent revival of the moral
utility requirement has not materialized.290  In fact, as one
commentator points out, the PTO's revised 2001 patent examiner
guidelines on utility did not even mention morality or public policy
issues. 291 However, this failure could also be attributed to the PTO's
aversion to calling further attention to the controversy and its own
contradictory holding that declared the chimera unpatentable because
of longstanding PTO policy that human beings are not patentable,
while also not addressing earlier federal court decisions that upheld
patents on transgenic animals that contained human genes or
organs,92 rather than a definitive death knell for the moral utility
requirement itself.
It seems more accurate to say that it is unclear whether the belief
of most patent attorneys within the U.S. that the "American view" is
that "morality should ... have nothing to do with patents" 293 is indeed
shared by the PTO and the federal courts294 in a legal sense. Indeed,
the fact that the PTO granted a patent in the same year to the
University of Missouri for an invention involving a method of
producing a cloned mammal-which opponents claim amounts to
human cloning-simply highlights further the contradictions that
289. Fecteau, supra note 123, at 91.
290. Id. at 90-91; Enerson, supra note 221, at 693.
291. Enerson, supra note 221, at 693.
292. Fecteau, supra note 123, at 91-92.
293. Enerson, supra note 221, at 691 (quoting Ronald Schapira, Biotechnology Patents in
the United States, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, PATENTS AND MORALITY 171-72 (Sigrid Sterckx ed.,
1997).
294. Id. at 694.
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characterize an administrative agency like the PTO's actions in the
absence of clear Congressional and judicial direction on these issues.
Ironically, Enerson is quite correct in stating that the "American
view"-if one takes this term to mean the business interests that hold
enormous sway within the dominant society rather than an actual
statement of the law-is that morality should have nothing to do with
patents.295
3. Possibilities Within Prior Art-Three Illustrative
Problems
The issue that CIEL raised in the ayahuasca patent case about the
recognition of indigenous traditional knowledge as prior art in U.S.
patent law has subsequently been a subject of discussion by legal
commentators. The pertinent language of 35 U.S.C. § 102 is:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless .. the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States.
296
This language presents several problems for indigenous peoples
who may be seeking control over and/or compensation for the use of
their traditional knowledge. First, Section 102 only provides for
individual ownership of a patent on an invention.297 More than one
person may certainly hold a patent, for example, a group of scientists
may jointly own a particular patent, but the law only recognizes that
ownership as fundamentally individual. In contrast, traditional
knowledge is often held collectively, 298 for example by a particular
295. Id. at 691.
296. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
297. Fecteau, supra note 123.
298. The most cogent statement about the nature of indigenous knowledge has been made
by indigenous peoples themselves, and in the context of explaining why western intellectual
property law is inadequate to protect it:
Indigenous peoples who have participated in the CBD, WIPO, and other UN
processes, have consistently asserted our proprietary, inherent, and inalienable
rights over our traditional knowledge and biological resources. Those who wish
to impose intellectual property rights over our traditional knowledge and
resources, if successful, will transform our knowledge and resources into
individually owned, alienable commodities, subject to IPR protection for a short
period of time. For instance, patents typically are granted for 20 years. Western
property law, and in particular, intellectual property rights, are contradictory to
the customary laws of Indigenous peoples to safeguard and protect our traditional
knowledge.
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clan, sibling-group, or the tribe as a whole. Indigenous peoples have
their own, often elaborate, set of customary laws that govern the
holding, use, and dissemination of traditional knowledge whether it is
held collectively or, in some cases, individually.
The closest parallel in U.S. patent law that allows for
"collective" ownership of a patent is its treatment of the corporation
as a legal person capable of individual ownership. There are,
however, significant differences between the structure and rules
governing a corporation and those governing a clan, sibling-group, or
tribe. While a deeper analysis of these differences is beyond the
scope of this article, a few basic comparisons should convey some
sense of the magnitude of these differences. On a superficial level, a
corporation is a group of people and a tribe, clan, or sibling-group is
also a group of people. However, in U.S. law, a corporation is treated
as a legal person, that is, an individual, for certain designated
purposes. 299 As a legal person, a corporation has constitutional rights
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments,300  Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment,30 1 and a limited First Amendment right of expression in
commercial matters.30 2
The corporation is a legal fiction, a nonliving entity created
strictly for business purposes. The corporation itself can survive
indefinitely, being perpetual, regardless of the death of shareholders,
directors, or officers. 30 3 In contrast, in indigenous societies, if the
members of a tribe, clan, or sibling-group die, then so too does the
tribe, clan, or sibling-group. Corporations can only conduct business,
and must do so within the confines of Western notions of economics,
i.e., maximizing shareholder profit, or risk breaking corporate law.
For example, while over half of the states have laws that authorize a
corporate Board of Directors to consider the interests of non-
shareholder groups in some of their corporate decision-making, these
statutes are discretionary and typically apply in the limited context of
unsolicited tender offers that may have an adverse impact on the
Collective Statement of Indigenous Peoples on the Protection of Indigenous Knowledge,
Agenda to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (New York) (May 10-21, 2004),
available at http://ww.ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/pf2004.html.
299. See, e.g., Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 1.40(5), (16) (2002).
300. Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1946).
301. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
302. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
303. Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 3.02 (2002).
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community in which the merging or merged corporation is located. 3°
Even with these limitations, non-shareholder constituency statutes are
controversial and to be an unwise departure from traditional corporate
law principles in some circles.
Contrast this characteristic of Western corporate law in the U.S.
with the fact that tribes, clans, and sibling-groups are simultaneously
economic, social, cultural, legal, and religious entities.3"" These
entities must holistically consider community, customary law, equity
and justice, kinship, personal efficacy, and spirituality, even as they
are conducting economic activities.3 °6
U.S. law treats this nonliving business entity with so much
deference that it allows the entity itself to have some fundamental
constitutional rights that are ordinarily only granted to living
individuals within American society. In contrast, indigenous peoples
do not accord rights to their economic entities that are separate from,
and therefore potentially conflicting with, the rights that people
themselves hold within the society whether as individuals, members
of a clan, sibling-group, warrior society, and so forth.
Embedded in U.S. patent law and those two words in Section
102(b), "a person," are the values and cultural norms that gave rise to
the corporate form in American law in the first place, just as
embedded within indigenous laws governing traditional knowledge
are the values and cultural norms that gave rise to clans, sibling-
groups, and tribes. U.S. patent law recognizes this cultural bias in its
use of the word "person" in Section 102(b), which only applies to
human individuals and legal fictions like the corporate entity. This is
a brief analysis of the enormity of the difference between indigenous
and Western thought, represented in just two words in Section 102(b).
Much more could be said about this topic, but it should be covered in
a separate article. Two more important obstacles will be reviewed,
both of which have been the subject of legal commentary and are
reflected in the language of Section 102(b).
The second important obstacle may be found in the use of the
words "printed publication" in Section 102(b). While much
traditional knowledge is not written, Section 102(b) allows for the
304. LARRY D. SODERQUIST, ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 515-16 (5th ed. 2001).
305. REBECCA ADAMSON, INDIGENOUS ECONOMICS: COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (syllabi and course materials) (Additional information may be
obtained by contacting First Nations Development Institute, 11917 Main Street, Fredericksburg,
Virginia 22407, (540) 371-5615).
306. Id.
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recognition of prior art from this or a foreign country only if it is in
written form, specifically, a printed publication. This creates an
obvious obstacle to the recognition within the U.S. of prior art
emanating from indigenous peoples whether they reside inside or
outside the U.S., as noted by commentators. However, legal
commentators have generally not looked very deeply into the broader
historical context of and attitudes towards indigenous peoples and
their resources that have implicitly, if not explicitly, shaped patent
law from its earliest years.
Professor Margo Bagley at Emory University argues that
supposed evidentiary problems and assumed inaccessibility to the
American public influenced Congress to enact the geographical
limitation in the first place.3°7 She points out that the initial drafts of
the Patent Act of 1790 and 1793 defined prior art without regard to
location.30 8 During this era of patent law in the U.S., the Supreme
Court in 1833 went so far as to declare, "[b]ut it was not the intention
of this law, to take from the public, that of which they were fairly in
possession.,, 30 9 Bagley then notes that Congress introduced the
geographical limitation into patent law without articulating a reason
for such limitation.310 She therefore looks for clues for the change in
Supreme Court dicta in the 1850 case of Gayler v. Wilder:
If the foreign invention had been printed or patented, it was already
given to the world and open to the people of this country ... upon
reasonable inquiry. They would therefore derive no advantage
from the invention here.., and the inventor therefore is not
considered to be entitled to the reward. But if the foreign
discovery is not patented, nor described in any printed publication,
it might be known and used in remote places for ages, and the
people of this country be unable to profit by it. The means of
obtaining [the] knowledge would not be within their reach .... [I]t
would be the same thing as if the improvement had never been
discovered. It is the inventor here that brings it to them, and places
it in their possession. And as he does this by the effort of his own
genius, the law regards him as the first.., inventor.., although
307. Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior
Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 699 (2003).
308. Id. at 721.
309. Id. at 698 (quoting Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 320 (1833)).
310. Id.
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the improvement had in fact been invented before, and used by
others.
After declining to speculate herself why global prior art
definitions existed in the early Patent Acts, 312 Bagley argues that the
above passage comports with speculation by Professor Donald
Chisum, an expert on patent law at Santa Clara University, that
perceived inaccessibility of foreign uses to the U.S. public was the
main justification for the promulgation of a geographical limitation in
1836.313 Bagley quotes from Chisum as a preeminent patent
commentator, but she lets pass without comment the considerable
doubt that Chisum himself expressed of the validity of these
justifications for the geographical limitation even in the 19th century
by repeatedly referring to a "convenient presumption of
inaccessibility," a "convenient presumption of accessibility," and
"supposed evidentiary problems" in those quotes.314
While Bagley's analysis is cogent if one chooses to confine
one's scholarship solely to a world where the indigenous are largely
ignored, her search for clues does not search deeply enough,
especially since she considers the geographical limitation in U.S.
patent law in relation to indigenous peoples and bio-piracy. Chisum,
who also favored the elimination of the geographical limitation,3" 5
was probably also dubious about the inception of the geographical
limitation even in the 19th century because it smacks of protectionism
rather than because of any awareness of or concern for its relationship
to indigenous peoples. Indeed, Andrew Jackson, a populist president,
was also known for his advocacy of protectionist measures in the
American economy as well as the firm institutionalization of a
nascent spoils system in the White House. However, as previously
311. Id. at 698-99 (quoting Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 497 (1850)
(emphasis added)).
312. Id.
313. Bagley, supra note 307, at 699-700.
314. The complete quotes from Chisum are:
the exclusion of unpublished foreign uses was based on a convenient
presumption of inaccessibility just as the inclusion of published foreign sources
was based on a convenient presumption of accessibility .... There is no clear
statement of the reason for excluding unpublished foreign uses either in the
report accompanying the 1836 Act or in the subsequent codifications. The
supposed evidentiary problems in proving prior foreign uses were undoubtedly
influential. Also accessibility to the public in the United States was probably an
overriding principle.
Bagley, supra note 307, at 699-700.
315. Id.
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discussed, it is extremely instructive to consider what was going on in
the U.S. with indigenous peoples during the same era that the
geographical limitation was first promulgated for several reasons.
Bagley herself unknowingly touches on critical junctures in U.S.
history that have deep significance for the direction this country took
in relation to indigenous peoples within the U.S. as well as in patent
law. Specifically, she concludes that, even if the "supposed"
evidentiary problems and "convenient" inaccessibility were valid
concerns in the bygone era of the 19th century patent law, they
certainly are not valid now. 316 She points out that the geographical
limitation is a bad rule that should not be retained for any better
reason than that it has been around since the time of Andrew
Jackson.3 17
The Jackson Administration was one of those critical junctures
in the development of U.S. policies towards indigenous peoples, as
well as in patent law. This was all! accomplished during the era of
Manifest Destiny in the U.S. Even without deeper analysis of the
bygone era in question in relation to the indigenous peoples of the
U.S., Bagley concludes that the geographical limitation may have
been constitutional when originally enacted.31 8 The Marshall Trilogy
reveals important information about a very pertinent constitutional
crisis that occurred contemporaneous to the passage of the limitation.
There is some doubt whether the geographical limitation would have
been passed, even back then, had it not been for two very important
factors overlooked today by commentators on intellectual property
and indigenous peoples: (1) the Marshall Trilogy and (2) the contempt
that the Jackson Administration and white society exhibited for their
own laws when dealing with indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, even
in this vacuum, Bagley makes a fairly persuasive argument that it is
now "patently unconstitutional., 319 However, it is evident from the
response of Professor Nard, discussed in further detail below, that a
deeper analysis of that era has important ramifications for the
contemporary analysis of intellectual property issues involving
indigenous peoples.
Examining the rise of the geographical limitation in U.S. patent
law sheds critical light on other parts of Bagley's analysis. For
example, she points out that the provision's retention was
316. ld. at 721-22.
317. Id. at 721.
318. Id. at 721-22.
319. Id. at 679.
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controversial in the 20th century-being the subject of a Presidential
Commission report in 1966 that recommended its repeal32 0 -and
traces the source of the failure to repeal the provision then to pressure
from the small business lobby and other interest groups.
32 1
Bagley then relates the example of Larry Proctor, a Colorado
seed company owner, who, in 1994 bought a bag of edible mixed
beans in Sonora, Mexico, bringing them back to the U.S. Once in the
U.S., he planted the seeds he obtained and allowed them, A la Sally
Fox, to self-pollinate until he achieved a uniform population of
yellow beans.32 2 He then patented that particular shade of yellow
bean under U.S. patent law, naming it the "Enola" bean, and sued a
company that was importing yellow Mexican beans. 3  Like Fox,
Proctor carved out a market for himself within the U.S. as the so-
called "inventor" of what was originally an indigenously-developed
product, and attacked other businesses within the U.S. by using the
patent laws in a similar fashion as Fox did initially against BC Cotton.
However, unlike Fox, who dropped her lawsuit against BC
Cotton in the U.S. and has not pursued any further litigation over
naturally-colored cotton, Proctor was apparently not content to allow
nationals from the originating country to continue with the niche they
had already carved out in the bean market. Unlike the Native Cotton
Project of Peru, which developed markets primarily outside the U.S.,
thus avoiding too much competition with Fox, Mexican farmers and
exporters had a market within the U.S. prior to Proctor's
"discovery."3 2 4 Mexican farmers and exporters experienced a 90%
drop in sales3 25 as a direct result of Proctor's ability to stop the
importation of any beans in "his" particular color range. 26 Bagley
refers to the Enola bean patent dispute as a "stunning example of the
type of problems that might have been avoided had Congress
implemented the changes recommended by the 1966 Presidential
Commission's report. 32 7
In addition, Bagley states that the "problems identified by the
Presidential Commission have only increased in the years since
320. Bagley, supra note 307, at 700-01.
321. Id. at 701.
322. Id. at 701-02.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 702.
326. Bagley, supra note 307, at 702.
327. Id. at 701.
442 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LI.. [Vol. 21
publication of the report.328  She maintains that the geographical
limitation is obsolete and counterproductive, arguing that consumers
in other countries can get these beans at a fair price while consumers
within the U.S. must pay higher prices because of Proctor's patent
monopoly. 329 However, the Enola bean and the naturally-colored
cotton patents are precisely the point, continuing a long-standing,
protectionist, and unfair economic advantage to the descendants of
settler populations, a consequence that neither Congress nor the courts
to this day want to avoid.
Excising the legal and illegal realities that confronted indigenous
peoples when the geographical limitation first became law in this
country minimizes the contemporary reality of exactly whom the
limitation continues to benefit today. For example, Bagley declares
that the geographical limitation benefits anyone whose main market is
in the U.S. 33 0 Apparently, half of all U.S. patents are granted to
foreign inventors. 33' This simultaneously obscures the racist thread
that so clearly connects this statutory provision to indigenous peoples
of the past as well as the present. It also overlooks the effects of
collaborating Western-educated and Western-aligned elites, who are
often from lesser-developed countries themselves with large
populations of the indigenous within them, and who serve to
rationalize continuing Western hegemony against their own
countrymen.
A deeper analysis would not overlook the fact that apparently
none of these foreign inventors who are patenting under U.S. law are
the indigenous originators of the patented item, but rather Western-
aligned groups and individuals who display the same disregard for
and/or ignorance about indigenous peoples as so-called inventors
originating from within the U.S. do. An analysis that overlooks the
effects of and motivations for these kinds of collaboration is
incomplete. And, obviously, indigenous peoples have not in the past,
and are unlikely in the future, to be impressed by equal opportunity
disregard for indigenous law.
The last important illustrative problem to be considered here is
the fact that, according to Section 102, prior art from a foreign
country is to be recognized. 332 "Foreign country" in Section 102
328. Id.
329. Id. at 703.
330. Id. at 718.
331. Id. at 728 n. 189.
332. 35 U.S.C. §102(b) (1994).
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clearly refers to the nation-state, not the legalized half-life in which
indigenous peoples currently find themselves within and outside the
Unites States as a result of the Marshall Trilogy and its progeny.
Indeed, the lesser-developed nation-states, within which many
indigenous peoples find themselves today, have frequently
"equalized" 333 their economies with those of more Westernized
countries at the expense of their indigenous populations.334
This state of affairs naturally has important ramifications for the
proposed solutions, including Bagley's, for indigenous peoples via
suggested reforms of prior art requirements in U.S. patent law.
Indeed, a critic of Professor Bagley's approach, Professor Craig Nard
at Case Western Reserve University, who is also a lecturer at the
World Intellectual Property Organization's Academy at the
University of Torino in Italy, epitomizes what is wrong with nation-
states, their representatives, and advocates making such proposals in
the absence of meaningful participation by indigenous peoples. Nard
defends the geographical limitation, asserts that it facilitates the
greatest development and dissemination of products for the majority
of potential beneficiaries, profits should be shared with host nation-
states and "keepers of the traditional knowledge," and that traditional
knowledge is otherwise "underutilized. 3 35 His response reeks of the
kind of recitation of rote learning about indigenous peoples that
passes uncritically from one American generation to the next that
Stannard criticized in his book American Holocaust.: Columbus and
the Conquest of the New World,336 and indeed Bagley has criticized.337
The idea that less developed nation-states would willingly or fairly
share the benefits of traditional knowledge with the actual creators of
that knowledge is highly implausible. The U.S. has never done that
with the indigenous peoples within its borders, so why would lesser-
developed countries? Indeed, it is the U.S. that seeks to impose its
own style of patent law upon the rest of the world.
333. "Equalized" simply means that they have adopted laws and/or signed international
treaties, such as TRIPS, to jumpstart their economies into looking ostensibly as much like the
economy of the United States today as possible without being allowed to adopt the protectionist
laws that United States has historically done freely and still continues to do, whenever
necessary, to bolster its economic development.
334. Fecteau, supra note 123, at 81.
335. Craig Allen Nard, Correspondence, In Defense Of Geographic Disparity, 88 MIN. L.
REv. 222, 224-29 (2003).
336. STANNARD, supra note 237, at 49.
337. See generally Margo A. Bagley, Correspondence, Still Patently Unconstitutional: A
Reply to Professor Nard, 88 MINN. L. REV. 239 (2003).
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It begs the question of why indigenous peoples should be sharing
the benefits with the enclosing nation-state at all. Of course, Nard
never asks this question, although it is an extremely important one
that undergirds the entire debate on bio-piracy and the proposed
"sharing" of traditional knowledge with Westerners. Another
pertinent question arising from Professor Nard's piece is exactly to
whose underutilization does he refer when he states that traditional
knowledge is "underutilized?" In addition, exactly how is traditional
knowledge being underutilized? Nard's statement about the
"underutilization" of traditional knowledge implicitly rests on the
presumption that traditional knowledge is not really being used unless
Westerners, mostly whites, are using it, even if that westernized use is
basically identical to indigenous use, as it so frequently is.
This is the same kind of presumption upon which the ayahuasca
and even the naturally-colored cotton controversies rested. The
indigenous peoples of the Amazon were not really using ayahuasca;
Loren Miller was. The indigenous peoples of Peru were not really
using naturally-colored cotton; Sally Fox was. The indigenous
peoples of Mexico were not really using the Enola bean; Hugo
Proctor was. The indigenous peoples of the U.S. were not really
using their land; white settler populations are. The list goes on and
on.
Furthermore, Nard doubts Bagley's suggestion that
pharmaceutical firms "can still deliver new drugs based on traditional
knowledge" as long as the drugs are novel and nonobvious.338 He
states that "[t]hough the assumed rationale for the geographic
limitation may be anachronistic, doing away with it (and therefore the
prospect of patent rights) would obstruct wealth creation." '339 This
begs the question of to whose "wealth creation" are we referring?
Nard attempts to conflate indigenous and Western wealth creation by
arguing that benefit sharing as well as "private ordering" and the
pharmaceutical industry will suffer without a geographical limitation
because "traditional knowledge will not be optimally
commercialized., 340 Yet, this conveniently assumes that it is only the
pharmaceutical industry that can bring traditional knowledge to the
non-indigenous world. Why? Is it because indigenous peoples and
their economic systems are dead, near-dead, or should be? Of course,
338. Nard, supra note 335, at 229 (quoting Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional:
The Geographic Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 719 (2003)).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 230-31.
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Professor Nard and most commentators would not openly say this, but
their arguments often rest on this assumption.
The Native Cotton Project managed to carve out a niche market
outside of the U.S., but this was in the face of enormous odds against
it, much of that coming from the developing nation that enclosed the
indigenous peoples who developed the cotton in the first place. Nard
does not even address the possibility that a developing nation might
not have the interests of its indigenous peoples at heart, even as he
acknowledges that indigenous peoples should be compensated for
commercial exploitation of their knowledge, safeguards against bio-
piracy should be developed, and mutual consent procedures
developed.34 1 Exactly how is that to be accomplished if indigenous
peoples are surrounded by and subordinated to a nation-state that is
hostile to their interests at worst and frequently indifferent to them at
best? This is not to say that benefiting indigenous peoples and the
non-indigenous are mutually exclusive. It is to say that the
marginalization of indigenous peoples, their laws, and traditional
economies is not required, as Nard implicitly assumes, nor the
provision of inducements for Western pharmaceutical companies to
commercialize the fruits of traditional knowledge, as Nard explicitly
states.34 2 A jettisoning of the colonial mindset is imperative. Candid
discussion of what that might entail is necessary.
Current proposals that offer Indigenous peoples benefit sharing
arrangements simply coerce Indigenous peoples into participation
in the economic exploitation of their knowledge and resources
without realizing the legal implications in doing so. No nation
should be forced to market their cultural patrimony, yet that is
precisely what current discussions suggest with regard to
Indigenous peoples.
343
Finally, indigenous peoples should be able to retain their right to
not commercialize traditional knowledge at all, if they so choose.3 "
341. Id. at 231.
342. Id. at 226.
343. Collective Statement of Indigenous Peoples on the Protection of Indigenous
Knowledge, Agenda to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (New York) (May 10-
21, 2004), available at http://ww.ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/pf2004.html.
344. Nard, supra note 335, at 245.
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IV. CONVERGING SOLUTIONS?
A. Institutional and Attitudinal Conundrums
The overriding problem here is that neither the PTO, nor any
other permanent Western intellectual property organization, has
adequately recognized the well-developed and often elaborate
customary laws and rules that indigenous peoples have long had in
place with regard to their own knowledge. In a recent, pivotal report,
the multinational Commission on Intellectual Property Rights
("CIPR") concluded that the customary laws of indigenous peoples
relating to indigenous knowledge should be respected and, if possible,
recognized more widely.345 While not elaborating on exactly why
such recognition might be impossible, one can infer from the CIPR's
accompanying acknowledgement that nation-state recognition of
indigenous customary laws would raise issues beyond the scope of its
report,346 that those larger issues are what really are behind nation-
state resistance to this most obvious solution to the problem.
The CIPR, although appointed by the British Government, was
specifically established as a multinational group of individuals with a
variety of viewpoints 347 to conduct its work in as objective a manner
348
as possible and come to practical, balanced solutions. Included
among its tasks was the consideration of how international rules and
agreements might be improved and developed in the area of
traditional knowledge. 349  The eight-chapter Report devoted one
chapter to the subject.
345. CIPR, supra note 108, at 80.
346. Id.
347. CIPR, supra note 108. The Commissioners included Professor John Barton
(Commission Chair) and George E. Osborne Professor of Law at Stanford University; Mr.
Daniel Alexander, a London barrister specializing in intellectual property law; Professor Carlos
Correa, Director of the Masters Programme on Science and Technology Policy and Management
at the University of Buenos Aires; Dr. Ramesh Mashelkar FRS, Director General of the Indian
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and Secretary to the department of Scientific and
Industrial Research of Delhi, India; Dr. Gill Samuels CBE, Senior Director of Science Policy
and Scientific Affairs (Europe) at Pfizer Ltd, in Sandwich, UK; and Dr. Sandy Thomas, Director
of Nuffield Council on Bioethics in London.
348. Id. at i-ii.
349. The Report's Preface states the Commission's tasks as to consider: how national IPR
regimes could best be designed to benefit developing countries within the context of
international agreements, including TRIPS; how the international framework of rules and
agreements might be improved and developed-for instance in the area of traditional
knowledge-and the relationship between IPR rules and regimes covering access to genetic
resources; the broader policy framework needed to complement intellectual property regimes
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The Report concluded that the customary laws relating to
traditional knowledge should be respected, if possible, and recognized
more widely.35 ° In contrast to the CIPR, other more permanent
international organizations concerned with intellectual property issues
often exhibit a decided preference, even insistence, that Western
intellectual property laws currently provide sufficient protection for
indigenous, or traditional knowledge l.3 5  This is hardly surprising
since organizations, such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") and the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
are creations of and legal servants to their nation-state members.
However, these same organizations continually portray themselves as
being appropriate, neutral arbiters in the entire debate over intellectual
property law,352 including the place of traditional knowledge.
Within the U.S., revival of the moral utility requirement must
include indigenous peoples in a meaningful way, together with public
discussion on the advisability of allowing the patenting of animals
and plants. A Congressional ban, or at least an indefinite moratorium,
on such patents during public debates is necessary, even critical.
The history of the biotechnology industry in this country, the
industry's dominance of the media, and the resulting
mischaracterization of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and biotechnology
critics in the literature, while patent after patent on genetically
modified living organisms has been granted, demonstrate how
dependent the industry is on public ignorance of existing criticisms
that emanate from indigenous and Western sources, creating an
appearance of the inevitability of genetic engineering within the
context of patenting life forms. This, in turn, has obscured the fact
including, for instance, controlling anti-competitive practices through competition policy and
law. Id. at i.
350. Id. at 8.
351. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce Discussion Paper, Protecting
Traditional Knowledge, at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements-rules/statements
/2001/protecting%20traditional%20knowledge.asp (last visited Nov. 26, 2004) ("ICC also
believes it essential that any new system for protecting traditional knowledge be compatible
with existing intellectual property rights, in particular patents."). See also Carlos M. Correa &
Sisule F. Musungu, The WIPO Patent Agenda: The Risks for Developing Countries (Nov. 2002),
at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wipopatent/toc.htm for a discussion of the effects of
enormous pressure brought to bear on developing countries (in which many indigenous peoples
reside) to adopt intellectual property regimes that conform to those in developed countries.
352. Bell, supra note 286; see also Martin Khor, Indigenous People Criticise WiPO
Approach, Third World Network, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/wipo2-cn.htm (last visited
Nov. 26, 2004). Finally, note that the USPTO and WIPO have recently agreed to work together
to develop common policy objectives when it comes to protecting traditional knowledge and
folklore.
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that we already have working sustainable development models from
which to draw viable alternatives in both the indigenous and non-
indigenous spheres that we as a country have been actively
discouraging, and even oppressing, using outmoded laws.
The argument that biotechnology is the only answer to
worldwide poverty, world health problems, and environmental
pollution is also an attempt to build a false and misleading bootstrap
argument. For example, the overwhelming majority of significant
medical breakthroughs in humankind's history have all occurred
without either genetic engineering or patents on living organisms. In
contrast, in spite of the tremendous impetus of spurious, but lucrative
patents there have been no medical breakthroughs emanating from the
furious pace of genetic engineering. There have, however, been a lot
of public statements about what genetic engineering might be able to
do and possibly could do with no acknowledgement of just how far
away and speculative such claims are. A ban on such patents will not
end research; it will, however, stimulate a debate on whether such
research is best performed by the public sector under strict regulations
that do not jeopardize small farms, the environment, and indigenous
peoples.
Congressional legislation that discourages the commercial use
and patenting of genetically engineered plants and animals would
simultaneously give the PTO the clear direction it needs when
confronted with such patent applications. A legislative ban on
patenting of genetically-engineered and other living organisms would
also do a great deal to alleviate the crushing governmental policies
that have already been brought to bear on indigenous peoples and
their economic systems. Congress should, however, go even further
than a mere ban by affirmatively providing the infrastructure and
other support that indigenous systems, at least within the U.S., need to
thrive. Such affirmative action would simultaneously spill over into
non-indigenous sustainable systems, creating a beneficial model in
which distinctly different but parallel Western and indigenous
systems can co-exist and thrive rather than the former being
dependent on exploiting and suppressing the latter.
Patent law, without a viable moral utility requirement that
conscientiously includes the voices of indigenous peoples,
unnecessarily and counterproductively reflects and facilitates,
acts of genocide [that] are most easily concealed in a world
atmosphere of complicitous silence; [where] a people is
extinguished with a whimper, not a bang. An equal voice would
certainly not necessarily guarantee the continued protection and
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preservation of the centuries-old visions of tribal peoples. Denying
that voice, however, would most assuredly assist the efforts of
those in power who seek the silent liquidation of colonized tribal
peoples.
3X
B. Proposed Solutions for Indigenous Peoples
The above quotation was made in the context of indigenous
peoples struggles at the international level. However, the U.S. has
some important, and extensive, unfinished business with respect to
the indigenous peoples within its own borders. While, as Lam notes,
settlers within the U.S. continue to cling to their self-conferred
legitimacy via the "vast compendium of the laws of dispossession...
known... as 'Federal Indian Law' 3 54 ... [which are characterized
by] 'the willingness of the Supreme Court to supply whatever
justification is needed for the actions of Congress [vis-A-vis
Indians],', 355 there really is no justification for this kind of oppressive
relationship to continue into the 21 st century.
As a beginning, Congress should pass legislation rescinding Title
25 U.S.C. § 17, which declared in 1871 that Indian tribes were not
sovereign nations with whom the U.S. could make any additional
treaties. However, rescinding § 17 without a conscious jettisoning of
the bullying that has characterized federal and state relations with
Indian tribes would be useless and perhaps even counterproductive.
With a candid, well-publicized evaluation of its past and present
relations with Indian tribes, U.S. policy could be much less tainted by
and dependent upon maintaining laws designed to buttress the U.S. as
a 21 st century colonial power within the Americas.
The federal government should also institute a "Marshall Plan"
to provide Indian tribes with the infrastructure and contracts it needs
to rebuild their economies in the manner they deem most appropriate.
Congress should pass legislation designed to implement such a policy,
with an emphasis on indigenous models of economic development,
rather than try to impose Western economic models that may be
neither welcome nor advisable for Indian tribes. Congress should
353. MAIVN CLECH LAM, AT THE EDGE OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 201-02 (Transitional Publishers, Inc. 2000) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
354. Id. at 15 (quoting DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW (4th ed. 1998)).
355. Id. at 16 (quoting Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1 (1987)).
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simultaneously promulgate legislation that encourages existing
sustainable development models in the non-Indian sector.
Finally, it should be noted that, at the direction of Congress, the
PTO has recently announced a "21st Century Strategic Plan" to
improve itself.356 Indigenous peoples should not be forgotten as the
PTO moves forward with these efforts. They should be included in
this process at the PTO as well as at higher levels. The rest of the
American public needs to be involved in a meaningful way. Yes, this
will probably be a messy, difficult process. Democracy and morality
tend to be that way.
Recent events in corporate America are telling. The elderly in
this country are pitted against giant pharmaceutical companies that
seek to extend their patents on medications with attempts to block
inexpensive generic drugs. The same sordid story has already been
repeated in Africa, ravaged by the AIDS virus, and unable to afford
the expensive drugs peddled by multinationals. At a broader level,
public confidence in the integrity of American business is suffering,
as the stock market plummets in the face of increasing evidence of
widespread corporate and financial corruption in the wake of the
Enron scandal. The chickens are coming home to roost. It is past
time at least to begin the long journey of ending the duplicitous
perpetuation of de facto colonial policies within the laws of the U.S.
It is past time to return integrity to patent law.
356. Charles P. Baker, Recent Developments Lead to Section Activities, 6 A.B.A. SEC. OF
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (July 2002).
